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Abstract
This thesis delineates the phenomenological basis of ownership and property. The
phenomenological theory of property has three main elements: the minimal self, the rela-
tionship between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, and the psychological
phenomenon of associative self-anchoring. The well established neurocognitive concept
of the minimal self encapsulates a person’s immediate self-consciousness, and the non-
conceptual senses of agency and ownership are two integral constituents of this immediate
sensory experience. Notably, this sense of self is typified by a motor intentionality (i.e., the
minimal self is primed for goal-directed actions). The motor character of the minimal self
primarily manifests itself in the construct of the body schema—a dynamic mental model of
the body that functions as an instrument of directed action. A remarkable feature of the
body schema is that it expands to incorporate extracorporeal objects that are objectively
controlled by the person (e.g., grasping a pen or holding an umbrella). Moreover, this
embodiment of extracorporeal objects is accompanied by the phenomenological feeling of
ownership towards the embodied objects. In fact, I demonstrate with the aid of empiri-
cal evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology that the sense of ownership
and the sense of agency are inextricably linked, and that the sense of agency modulates
(engenders) the sense of ownership. In other words, the mere experience of agency over an
object is capable of evoking the sense of ownership—the influence of the sense of agency
in eliciting the sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt-like principles of priority, con-
sistency, and exclusivity. In addendum, the non-conceptual sense of ownership is shaped
and strengthened by the formation of implicit self-object associations—people psychologi-
cally associate themselves with their possessions. Altogether, the motor-intentional nature
of the self, the inherent sensory experience of ownership, and the capacity to establish
self-object psychological associations make the concept of personal property a natural cor-
relate of mechanisms that lead to the development of self-perception and representation.
The phenomenological theory also elucidates the psychological literature on ownership
judgments and the vague concept of intellectual property. It is also emphasised that as-
pects of this property theory are analogous to Hegel’s theory of property. As a result, the
phenomenological theory may have implications for Hegelian conceptions of property, and
can aid them in determining legitimate property relations—these typically denote a close
connection between property and personhood.
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This thesis is an exposition on the nature of ownership and property. The kernel of the
account presented is a phenomenological theory of property that posits a deep connection
between the sense of self and the neuropsychological concept of ownership. A remark-
able consequence of the theory is the fact that appropriation of property is an intrinsic
feature of human beings—in fact, property is a necessary component of self development.
Additionally, despite the power of the theory to explain a wide range of psychological
phenomenon, the underlying cognitive principles are deceptively simple. Notably, the the-
ory is firmly grounded in the empirical sciences—in particular, cognitive neuroscience and
neuropsychology.
In what is to follow, I will elucidate the basic cognitive mechanisms at work in ownership
perceptions, and establish the principles of the new theory. The next segment, Chapter 2,
introduces the concept of the minimal self, and demonstrates that the sense of ownership is
a key component of rudimentary self-consciousness. In addition, I showcase that the sense
of self is characterized by a motor intentionality (or a ‘motor power’) in the form of the
body schema— an adaptive and functional action-oriented model of the ‘body’, capable
of embodying extracorporeal objects. In Chapter 3, I establish that perceived agency is a
powerful cognitive primer to the sense of ownership. Chapter 4 synthesizes the concept of
the preceding two chapters with elements of associative psychology to delineate the mech-
anism of object ownership. Notably, the described mechanism of property acquisition is a
natural correlate of human self development. Chapter 5 employs the derived principles to
shed light on the psychological aspects of ownership— i.e., judgments and metarepresenta-
tions of ownership. The epilogue, Chapter 6, suggests that the theory may have normative
implications for the moral and legal direction of property rights.
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The current chapter will be more historical. Specifically, to properly frame the ensuing
discourse, I shall conduct a brief survey of prominent property theories. The historical
overview will not only allow us to see the shortcomings of existing property theories, but
also enable me to appropriate any prescience elements that they may contain.
There have been several major (often conflicting) philosophical accounts on the ori-
gin and nature of property— prominent, among these, are the theses of Plato, Aristotle,
Hegel, Locke, Hume, Kant, Marx, Bentham, and Mill.1 In order to traverse the broad the-
oretical landscape, I will classify property theories into three general groups: rights based
theories, conventional and utilitarian theories, and sociobiological/evolutionary theories.
Rights based theories can be further divided into two distinct lines of justifications: special
property rights (the notion that property rights are attained either by performing specific
actions or through certain events happening), and the general right to property.2
1.1 Locke’s Labor Theory of Property
The preeminent conception of a special rights based theory of property is Locke’s ‘labor-
desert’ theory. Locke faced the problem of devising a natural account of private property
constrained by the ordains of Scripture: If God gave the world in common to all men, ‘it
seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a Property
in any thing’.3 In order to develop an account of ‘just acquisition’, Locke conceives of the
person in the state of nature and emphasizes the moral significance of labor. Specifically,
by performing labour on a natural object (e.g., farming a piece of land), the person imbues
some or all of their intrinsic bodily rights onto the object — transforming the natural
object into private property.
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
1For a brief historical overview of theses on property and ownership, see Waldron, Jeremy, “Prop-
erty and Ownership”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), Edward Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/property/>. Alternatively, for a comprehensive
and excellent analysis of private property justifications, see Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988).
2The distinction is formally introduced by Jeremy Waldron in The Right to Private Property, p.3-25.
3John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett
(Cambridge, 1963) §25.
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hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property [and] excludes
the common right of other Men.4
Locke’s labor-desert theory of property is a first occupancy theory— i.e., the first person
to labor on a natural resource is privileged compared to all other people. Integrating the
concept of first occupancy with the value of labor, the ‘labor mixing’ account provides a
morally grounded concept of property that can theoretically arise without requiring any
explicit social conventions or political arrangements— the unilateral and just acquisition
of property is dictated by reason; it is not contingent on universal consent.
There are several loopholes and incoherencies in Locke’s account. The most conspicuous
is the ambiguity regarding the amount and type of labour required to establish possession.
In an influential thought experiment, Nozick demonstrated the point vividly: ‘If I own
a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea ... do I thereby come to own the sea, or
have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?’5 A second complication is the scope of the
justification provided by Locke. As Margaret Radin points out, Locke’s account of just
acquisition is situated in the state of nature, but in ‘a heroic inferential leap, he concludes
that if property is justified under those conditions, then it is ipso facto justified in the
capitalist market society with money and wage-labor.’6 The age-old charge that Locke’s
property account is ‘the standard bourgeois theory’, does not appear to be without merit.7
The inconsistencies in Locke’s theory are not merely hypothetical; there are real world
counterparts. Prior to the arrival of Britons, the Aborigines of Australia oversaw an
expansive and sophisticated communal management of the landmass.8 Locke’s theory does
not consider the collective labor performed by the Aborigines, making the labor aspect of
the theory somewhat confused.9 A related ‘lacuna’ was demonstrated by Hume and Kant.
They noted that prior to laboring on a piece of land, the person has to exclude others from
4Ibid., §28
5Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974), p.175
6Margaret Radin, “Property and Personhood”, Stanford Law Review (1982): 957-1015, p.979.
7Carol M. Rose, “Possession as the Origin of Property,” The University of Chicago Law Review 52,
no.1 (1985): 73-88, p.73.
8Bill Gammage, The Biggest Greatest Estate on Earth. How Aborigines Made Australia, (Sydney: Allen
& Unwin 2011).
9In the Second Treatise, Locke appears to ignore the possibility that land can be commonly owned and
cultivated: ‘God gave the World to Man in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the
greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should
always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to use of the Industrious and Rational (and Labour
was to be his Title to it); ... [emphasis added].’ Quoted in Waldron 1988, op. cit., p.171.
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trespassing, in order to ensure that common rights to the land does not interfere with their
(i.e., the person’s) intended project. If that is the case, then Locke’s labor theory ‘is either
redundant or inadequate’.10
1.2 The Hegelian Conception of Property
According to the legal and political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, among the most com-
prehensive general right based property theories is Hegel’s conception of property in the
Philosophy of Right— in particular, the first part, Abstract Right.11 In there, Hegel asserts
that object relations are necessary to transition from an abstract autonomy to a ‘definite
recognizable existence’— ‘the person must give its freedom an external sphere in order
to exist as Idea.’12 To that end, the abstract will of the person embodies objects in the
external world (‘sphere’) in order to objectively exist. Therefore, in essence, property is the
externalization of a person’s will— i.e., an embodiment of their personality. Notably, in
Hegel’s framework, the designated embodiment of inanimate objects is legitimate ‘because
the thing has no end in itself; its destiny and soul take on [the person’s] will’.13
Hegel describes three different modes of embodying objects: ‘grasping it physically’,
‘imposition of form’ (i.e., creating or forming an article), and ‘marking the object’.14 In the
first mode, the will of the person is directly present in the grasped object—i.e., the object
is directly under the person’s control and that that constitutes ownership. Alternatively,
the second method yields the creator of an object as the genuine owner. Despite superficial
similarities to labour based principles (i.e., ownership of an object is granted to the person
that labored on the object), the underlying reasoning of Hegel’s second mode of ownership
is quite different—the essential idea in Hegel is that the object belongs to the creator
because the formed object is an expression of the person’s will. As to the last mode of
appropriation, the rationale is that the mark is a public representation of the fact that the
marker has placed their will in the imprinted object. All three modes require the object
to be res nullius (ownerless) in order to take proper effect.
It should be noted that Hegel’s theory of property, in contrast to Locke’s theory, does
not grant an indefinite right to possess objects. The will of the person must be present in
10Ibid., p.173-174
11Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right [1821], trans. TM Knox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967).
12Ibid., §41. Hegel was an idealist, so in his metaphysics, a thing had to exist foremost as an Idea.
13Ibid., §44.
14Dudley Knowles, “Hegel on Property and Personality,” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 33, no.130
(1983): 45-62.
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the object to constitute ownership.15 Another important feature of the Hegelian property
framework is the connection between property and ethical development of the person—
property is necessary to achieve adequate self-expression, enable mutual recognition (‘Be a
person and respect others as persons’), and promote responsible agency. This connection
between ethical development of the person and private property has been construed by some
legal philosophers to constitute the foundations on which to develop theories of property
that argue for a general right to property—i.e., ‘everyone must have property’.16
The close connection between property and personhood also leads to the idea that there
should be a legal and moral dichotomy in property rights. Margaret Radin is a prominent
proponent of such a dichotomy and distinguishes two types of property— personal and
fungible. Personal property is property that is closely intertwined with personhood—
objects that are ‘part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in
the world.’ Alternatively, fungible property is property that is void of any deep connections
to personhood and is held for ‘purely instrumental reasons.’ Radin suggests that personal
property should be accorded greater legal protection than fungible property— personal
property ‘gives rise to a stronger moral claim’. In short, the neo-Hegelian personhood
perspective provides a general justification of property rights ‘in terms of their relationship
to personhood’, and that yields property entitlements on a continuum—‘[t]he more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement’.17
Aspects of Hegel’s property theory, extricated from the associated theory of histori-
cal development and Hegelian idealism, are discernable in the phenomenological theory
of property that I develop in this paper. In particular, the notion of embodied will pos-
sesses a neurocognitive analog in my theory—importantly, the phenomenological quality of
Hegel’s mode of appropriation is retained. Moreover, the important relationship between
property and personhood delineated by the Hegelians, provides the basis to construe moral
implications of the theory articulated in this essay.
1.3 Utilitarian & Evolutionary Property Theories
In direct opposition to the aforementioned rights based theories is the idea that property is
wholly conventional. Prominent manifestations of this viewpoint are Humean convention-
15‘Since property is the embodiment of personality [Dasein der Personlichkeit ], my inward idea and
will that something is mine is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end occupancy [die
Besitzergreifung ] is requisite.’ Hegel, op. cit., §51.
16Waldron 1988, op. cit., p.4.
17Radin, op. cit.
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alism and utilitarian property theories. In Hume’s view, property is an artificial construct
that emerges as a consequence of settled social rules to ‘bestow stability on the possession
of...external goods’. Prior to the establishment of property rules, possession of objects is
driven by factors such as physical force, chance, coercion and shrewdness until resources
are distributed such that it is favorable for an individual to ‘leave another in the posses-
sion of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner’; the resulting diminishment of
conflict is a prerequisite for the institution of social rules governing property.18 Compara-
ble sentiments are expressed by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, who remarked that ‘the
idea of property consists in an established expectation.’19 In particular, Bentham believed
that the requisite expectations can only be established by law. ‘A feeble and momentary
expectation may result from time to time from circumstances purely physical: but a strong
and permanent expectation can only arise from law.’20 Accordingly, Bentham viewed any
talk of natural property rights (and natural rights in general) as ‘nonsense upon stilts.’21
There is probably some truth in Hume and Bentham’s assertion that laws and social
norms stabilize property relations. But as we will see later, the view that property is
entirely conventional is undermined by direct empirical evidence from a wide range of
investigative domains—in fact, the evidence suggests that acquisition of property is as
natural as the acquisition of language.
The notion that accumulation of property is akin to language acquisition is a good
segway to the last category of property theories—i.e., sociobiological/evolutionary theories
of property. The foremost amongst these is the ‘territorial imperative’ theory deriving from
Freud and Darwin.22 A notable contemporary proponent is Jeffery Stake.
Stake argues that humans have a ‘property instinct’ analogous to the concept of a ‘lan-
guage instinct’ in theories of language.23 In the context of such a theoretical framework,
the general property instinct shared by all humans can give rise to various manifestations
that may or may not be encoded in law. Stake attempts to demonstrate that a large
number of property laws do indeed possess an evolutionary explanation — including First
in Time, First in Right feature of property laws, inheritance laws and the idiosyncratic
adverse possession doctrine. The evidence provided in support of the notion that certain
18David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739] L.A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (eds.), (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1978), p.489-90.
19Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation (R. Hildreth trans. 1840) (1st ed. 1802), p.112.
20Waldron 1988, op. cit., p.196.
21Waldron 1988, op. cit., p.16 & 83.
22Sigmund Freud, Civiltzation and Its Discontents, in Vol 21 of The Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud (The Standard Edition) (Strachey ed. 1964), p. 111-14.
23Jeffery Stake, “The property ‘instinct’,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 359, no.1451 (2004), 1763-1774.
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property laws are ‘grounded’ in evolutionary strategies is of varying quality, but more
importantly, Stake’s central argument that these fragmented and diverging strategies con-
stitute a property instinct seems strained. A recurring problem with Stake’s theory is that
it is hard to disentangle whether a particular property law is the result of an evolutionary
strategy hardwired into our brains, or merely the utilitarian implementation of some gen-
eral strategy that has a stabilizing effect on human societies. In addition, the studies cited
by Stake could plausibly be interpreted in a number of different ways. This makes it hard
to adjudge Stake’s conception of a property instinct.
With that said, Stake’s idea that there is a property instinct is not wrong. The problem
lies in the fact that the sociobiological/evolutionary account of property grossly underrates
the fundamental nature of the property instinct. Instead of a disparate set of evolutionary
strategies, the instinct to acquire property is closely tied with the emergence of the sense
of self—i.e., property is a reflection of an intrinsic facet of our nature. That is the account
of ownership and property I will develop in the remainder of the thesis—an account that
stems from the human sense of self and designates property acquisition as an essential




The existence of an intrinsic relationship between ownership and the concept of self is
prima facie tenuous. Ownership is an ubiquitous phenomenon, extending to objects that
are not explicitly related to the self; whereas the self generally involves what William
James referred to as ‘the feeling of the same old body always there’.1 The apparent
discrepancy suggests that constructing a theory of ownership based on the notion of self
is a specious endeavour. But contemporary developments in the philosophy of mind and
cognitive sciences are eroding that impression, and instead, giving way to the idea that the
phenomenal experiences of ownership and self are in fact interminably linked. The pivotal
theoretic approach of the minimal self underpins many of these developments. Indeed, the
minimal self provides the groundwork for the establishment of a neurocognitive theory of
ownership.
2.1 Two Concepts of Self
The minimal self is a rudimentary entity restrained to ‘immediate self-consciousness’ and
devoid of temporal continuity. Shaun Gallagher, in an influential paper on philosophical
conceptions of the self, describes the minimal self ‘as an immediate subject of experi-
ence, unextended in time’ and ‘almost certainly’ dependent on ‘an ecologically embedded
body’. The minimal self is not concerned with issues of personal identity, and in particu-
lar, does not address the persistence question (i.e., the ‘continuity of identity’ we typically
1William James, The Principles of Psychology [1890] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1983),
p.242.
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experience).2 To resolve those questions, philosophers generally have to grapple with con-
ceptions of self extended in time. For instance, Hume argued that personal identity is a
fiction. The person is ‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions’ and the
extended self is an illusion of the mind.3 Daniel Dennett developed a contemporary model
of Hume’s notion of personal identity termed the narrative theory of self. Informed by
modern neuroscience, the narrative theory of self points to the fact that neural process-
ing is distributed over different brain regions and that isolating a neurologically grounded
centre of experience is close to impossible. Instead, people employ the distinctive human
capacity of language to weave narratives around themselves and that these ‘stories’ about
oneself make existence coherent across time. Dennett proceeds to propose that the self is
‘a centre of narrative gravity’—the abstract point ‘where the various stories told about the
person, by himself and others, meet.’4
The narrative self is also composed of non-fictional biography and Gallagher notes
that that requires a reliable episodic memory. In fact, the importance of memory in
the constitution of the person precedes theories of the narrative self. Notably, Locke
considered a person to be ‘a thinking intelligent being’ endowed with episodic memory
that ‘can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.’5
Michael Gazzaniga integrated these ideas with results from studies on split-brain patients
to propose that the fictional and non-fictional aspects of the extended self are imbricated
by the ‘interpreter’ in the left hemisphere to produce intelligible narratives that constitute
the extended self.6
The ideas of Hume, Locke, Dennett, Gazzaniga, and Gallagher, among others, regarding
the nature of the extended self are important but they will not be the focus of attention
moving forward. Instead, the emphasis in this section would be on the minimal self,
void of long term continuity and accompanying conceptual considerations, but essential to
understanding the origins of the concept of ownership (having said that, after I establish
2Shaun Gallagher, “Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science,” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 4, no.1 (2000): 14-21.
3David Hume, “Of Personal Identity”, in A Treatise Of Human Nature [1739] (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1978), p.252.
4Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, (Little Brown & Co 1991). Ricoeur also discussed the
role of narratives in conceiving the self and proposed a more dynamic conception of the narrative self
compared to Dennett’s ‘centre of narrative gravity’ model. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself As Another, (University
of Chicago Press, transl. from Soi-meˆme comme un autre, Editions du Seuil, 1990). See also Gallagher,
op.cit., p.18-20.
5John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [2nd ed. 1694], (ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1975), p.335.
6Michael Gazzaniga, The Mind’s Past, (Basic Books 1998).
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the connection between ownership and the minimal self, the extended self will re-emerge in
construing people’s judgments of ownership within the framework of the developed theory).
The sense of self-agency and sense of self-ownership are two intimately related aspects of
minimal self-awareness (at least in non-pathological cases).7 Self-ownership is the persistent
perception that ‘my body’ belongs to ‘me’. Self-agency is the impression that ‘I’ am the
generator of an action. Gallagher differentiates these two aspects of the minimal self in
the context of motor action—the experiences of ownership and agency are extricated by
comparing voluntary (or willed) actions (e.g., when I move my arm) with involuntary
actions (e.g., when my arm is moved by another person). The senses of ownership and
agency are also distinguished by considering the breakdown of the immunity principle.
The principle states that there can not be a self-reference mistake in the use of the first
person pronoun ‘I’ in cases not entailing any ‘perceptual or reflective act of consciousness’—
i.e., cases of immediate and non-observational first person experience.8 Borrowing from
both Campbell and Frith, Gallagher argues that certain schizophrenic experiences (e.g.,
auditory hallucinations) may indicate the breakdown of the immunity principle and that
this malfunctioning of the immediate (minimal) self is caused by the sense of agency being
compromised.9
Discussion of the immunity principle and its potential collapse, though useful in in-
troducing certain elements of the minimal self, is not the primary mode of approaching
the subject. In fact, the formation of the minimal self precedes the development of lin-
guistic and conceptual capacities—the minimal self initially emerges as a ‘pre-linguistic’
7There has been a deluge of scholarship on the sense of agency and sense of ownership, and their respec-
tive contributions to the structure of the minimal self. For instance, Matthis Synofzik et. al proposed a
systematic neurocognitive account of ownership and agency with graded functional layers. They ‘[proceed]
from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational
processes of agency and ownership, respectively’. Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen, “I move, therefore I am:
A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership”, Consciousness and Cognition 17, no.2
(2008): 411-424.
8The immunity principle is an important corollary of expressivism—the view that self attribution of
mental states (‘self-ascriptions’) are bare expressions of mental states rather than reports or descriptions.
Expressivism generally traces its origins to Wittgenstein. See Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy
of Psychology, Vol. I (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980); and also Rodney Jacobsen, “Wittgenstein on Self-
Knowledge and Self-Expression”, The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 46, no.182 (1996): 12-30.
9Gallagher, op. cit. The idea that certain schizophrenic experiences violate the immunity principle
is postulated by Campbell in “Schizophrenia, The Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process”,
The Monist 82, no.4 (1999): 609-625. Conversely, explaining certain schizophrenic experiences in terms of
dysfunctional self-agency generating mechanisms is suggested by Frith in The Cognitive Neuropsychology
of Schizophrenia (Psychology Press 2014).
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and ‘ecological’ self-awareness in neonates.10 Tracing the development of rudimentary self-
awareness in young infants, Verschoor and Hommel, delineate the relationship between the
sense of ownership, sense of agency, and the minimal self in a recent paper.11 They discuss
evidence that the minimal self emerges by performing actions in the external environment—
to borrow from Descartes’ prose, ‘I move, therefore I am.’
2.2 Theory of Ideomotor Learning & Predictive Cod-
ing
Elementary goal directed actions can be observed in neonates less than an hour old,12
whereas 5-month old infants are able to perform the more complex action of grasping
interesting physical objects in their vicinity.13 Movement and corresponding visual in-
formation leads to the earliest signatures of self-recognition. In a study conducted by
Courage et al., mirror self-recognition preceded both the use of personal pronouns (‘self-
referent language’) and photo identification.14 Verschoor and Hommel posit15 that these
self-recognition studies indicate that the minimal self ‘is derived from perceived agency’ and
‘that infants apparently learn to predict the sensory effects of their bodily movements be-
fore they are actually able to experience ownership of their mirror image [emphasis added].’
An even stronger inference that one can draw from early indices of self-recognition is that
the experience of self-agency is a prerequisite for the experience of self-ownership.
Tentatively accepting the inferred causal sequence of agency and ownership leaves us
requiring the precise mechanism that leads to the development of the inceptive sense of
agency. A promising contemporary account is proposed by Verschoor and Hommel in
10See Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen, op. cit. See also Gallagher, ibid, p.17.
11Stephan A. Verschoor, and Bernhard Hommel, “Self-by-doing: The role of action for self-acquisition”,
Social Cognition 35, no.2 (2017): 127-145.
12For studies on goal directed actions in neonates, see Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore, “New-
born Infants Imitate Adult Facial Gestures”, Child Development (1983): 702-709; George Butterworth and
Brian Hopkins, “Handmouth coordination in the newborn baby”, British Journal of Developmental Psy-
chology 6, no.4 (1988): 303-314; and Bennett I. Bertenthal, “Origins and Early Development of Perception,
Action, and Representation” Annual Review of Psychology 47, no.1 (1996): 431-459.
13Bennett I. Bertenthal and Rachel K. Clifton, “Perception and action”, in Handbook of child psychology:
Vol. 2. Cognition, perception and language, ed. D. K. W. Damon & R. Siegler (New York: Wiley 1998),
51-102. See also Verschoor and Hommel, op. cit.
14Mary L. Courage, Shannon C. Edison, and Mark L. Howe, “Variability in the early development of
visual self-recognition”, Infant Behavior and Development 27, no.4 (2004): 509-532.
15Verschoor and Hommel, op. cit., p.130-1
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their aforementioned paper.16 They argue that unequivocal signs of intentional goal di-
rected actions—where ‘expected action outcomes [are taken] into account when deciding
which action to perform’—occur no earlier than 9 months of age. The authors argue that
bidirectional associations between actions and their anticipated effects is required for the
acquisition of genuine action control.17 In their theoretical framework, the bidirectional
associations are established by means of ideomotor learning.
The process of ideomotor learning leading to the acquirement of voluntary action control
is an idea that dates back to William James and Hermann Lotze. In the Principles of
Psychology, James writes that ‘... if, in voluntary action properly so-called, the act must
be foreseen, it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can perform
an act voluntarily for the first time.’18 The rule James invokes is that intentional goal
directed actions demand knowledge of the expected effects. In turn, that leads to the
principle, that to truly ‘anticipate the likely outcome of an action’ requires ‘knowledge
about the relationship between the action and its effects’.
The knowledge of goal directed actions and their effects is attained by performing ex-
ploratory movements in the environment and forming bidirectional associations between
actions and the associated perceptual changes—i.e., ideomotor learning. A bidirectional
association entails that sensory effects associated with actions are capable of evoking
actions—e.g., ‘thinking’ of the sensory effect activates the ‘effect’s internal representation’
and prompts the generation of the associated action. In short, bidirectional associations
render the possibility of voluntary actions (‘action selection’). The database of action-effect
associations is constructed during early years of life ‘through active interaction with one’s
physical and social environment.’ Young infants may also be learning from actions they
do not perform themselves. For instance, 6-month olds are able to predict the action goals
of others.19
Next, to explain the sense of agency, Verschoor and Hommel combine ideomotor learn-
ing with predictive coding in their theory. The perception of agency arises by matching the
predicted effects of movement (derived by ideomotor learning) with the actual effects. A
discrepancy between predicted effect and actual effects diminishes (or eliminates) the sense
16Verschoor and Hommel, ibid.
17Verschoor and Hommel, ibid., 129-134. See also Verschoor, Spape´, Biro, & Hommel, “From outcome
prediction to action selection: developmental change in the role of action-effect bindings”, Developmental
Science 16, no.6 (2013): 801-814.
18William James, op. cit., p.487; Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie oder die Physiologie
der Seele, (Leipzig: Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung 1852).
19Kazunori Kamewari, Masaharu Kato, Takayuki Kanda, Hiroshi Ishiguro, and Kazuo Hiraki, “Six-
and-a-half-month-old children positively attribute goals to human action and to humanoid-robot motion”,
Cognitive Development 20, no.2 (2005): 303-320.
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of agency whereas an adequate match generates the experience of agency. The view that
agency is a result of ‘predictive motor control’ is prevalent in contemporary neuroscience.20
To complete the construction of the minimal self, Verschoor and Hommel, hypothe-
size (on the basis of recent studies) that the sense of self-ownership arises by integrating
sources of information that generate agency with interoceptive information (i.e., internal
stimuli). Again, the implication is that the sense of ownership trails the development of
the sense of agency, and constitutes a more complex experience. The timeline of agency
preceding ownership is also conducive to the growth of motor capabilities—people are able
to represent the actions of others in analogous manner to their own actions, and the fact
that young infants are unable to discriminate between self and other generated actions
may be better for motor learning.21 Later, the acquisition of the sense of self-ownership
consummates the minimals self.
2.3 The Body Schema
The notion that perceived agency leads to the sense of ownership, and therefore ‘selfhood’,
is more explicitly supported in theories of the self based on the body schema. Homes
and Head introduced the notion of the body schema in a paper on sensory disturbances
associated with cerebral lesions.22 The body schema is a ‘coherent and dynamically up-
dated’ representation enabling actions and movements. It is distinct from the body image
—a ‘conscious representation’ based on ‘perceptual’ body features. Notably, the dynamic
nature of the body schema permits action control to extend beyond the body to objects
in the external world—i.e., the body schema is intrinsically action oriented.23
The construal of the body schema as a non-conceptual and embodied minimal self
originates in the writings of the French philosopher, Maurice MerleauPonty:
In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are
not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of
20For a review of conscious motor intention and agency, see Patrick Haggard, “Conscious intention and
motor cognition”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no.6 (2005): 290-295.
21Verschoor and Hommel, op. cit., p.139.
22Henry Head and Gordon Holmes. “Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions”, Brain 34, no.2-3
(1911): 102-254.
23Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia. “The bodily self as power for action.” Neuropsychologia 48,
no.3 (2010): 746-755. On the conceptual delineation of the body schema and body image, see Shaun Gal-
lagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification.” The Journal of Mind and Behavior
(1986): 541-554.
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relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body I
belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them Our bodily
experience of movement provides us with a way of access to the world and the
object, with a ‘praktognosia’, which has to be recognized as original and perhaps
as primary. My body has its world, or understands its world, without having
to make use of my ‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying function’[emphasis added].24
In the quoted passage, MerleauPonty is suggesting that there is a basic and essential
self represented by the body schema. He notes that the body schema is ‘neither the mere
copy nor even the global awareness of the existing parts of the body’ ; it is the ‘active
integration of these latter only in proportion to their value to the organism’s projects.’
In brief, the body schema is characterized by action potentiality—i.e., not ‘a spatiality of
position, but a spatiality of situation.’25
Another important observation that MerleauPonty makes in the passage is the notion
that the ‘body combines with’ and ‘includes’ space and time. The synthesis of body and
space noted by MerleauPonty is evident in peripersonal space—the dynamic space sur-
rounding body parts coded by certain neurons.26 Neurons dynamically tracking periper-
sonal space are typically bimodal, possessing both somatosensory and visual receptive
fields—i.e., they respond to visual stimuli (occurring in space near the body) and to tactile
stimulation of the body. Additionally, these neurons appear to be operating within a mo-
tor scheme. The combination of motor and bimodal properties of these neurons coalesces
body and peripersonal space into an instrument of directed action—the neural basis of
MerleauPonty’s ‘motor intentionality’.27
Consequently, the body schema (incorporating peripersonal space) yields a conception
of the minimal self analogous to MerleauPonty’s concept of body— a self ‘as the potential
source of a certain number of familiar actions’. This self gives rise to ‘action having
a field or scope’ determined by the peripersonal space—where the peripersonal space is
24Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (C Smith, trans. London, NY: Routledge 1962),
p.162.
25Merleau-Ponty, ibid., p.114-5. See also Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit.
26Giacomo Rizzolatti, Luciano Fadiga, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese, “The Space Around Us”,
Science 277, no.5323 (1997): 190-191.
27‘[W]e are brought to the recognition of something between movement as a third person process and
thought as a representation of movement—something which is an anticipation of, or arrival at, the objective
and is ensured by the body itself as a motor power, a “motor project” (Bewegungsentwurf), a “motor
intentionality” in the absence of which the order [to move] remains a dead letter.’ Merleau-Ponty, op. cit.,
p.126-7.
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the ‘surroundings as a collection of possible points upon which [the] bodily action may
operate.’28
A contemporary theory of the minimal self that is also based on the body schema is pro-
posed by Gallese and Sinigaglia.29 Similar to MerleauPonty, the (embodied) self described
is ‘enactive in nature’ and ‘primarily given to us as source or power for action’. They
argue that the ‘minimal sense of self’, defined as the set of possible motor potentialities,
‘is at the same time a prerequisite and a core component of both the sense of agency and
sense of ownership.’ Specifically, the ‘pre-noetic’ self is reflected in the body schema, a ‘dy-
namic binding principle [integrating] multiple sensory modalities’ and working ‘at the level
of [pre-reflective] motor intentionality.’ In support, evidence from experimental studies is
presented that shows intentional actions (perceived agency) mediate bodily self-awareness.
Parieto-premotor networks, involved in goal directed actions, are advanced as the neural
correlates of this minimal self experience.30
Theories of the self centred around the body schema complement theories of self based
on ideomotor learning and predictive coding—both construe the minimal self in terms of
motor cognition. Moreover, they both reach equivalent conclusions regarding the genesis of
self ownership. Verschoor and Hommel, in their paper on ideomotor learning and predictive
coding, assert that perceived agency is the precursor of self recognition and ownership. In
the same vein, the theory of Gallese and Sinigaglia postulates that ‘the potentiality for
action of our bodily self is a necessary condition to accomplish the sense of body ownership.’
The underlying theme in both assertions is that the pre-reflective corporeal self-awareness,
i.e., the experience of ‘the body as one’s own body’, is dependent on the availability of
motor intentional features. In fact, it may very well be that ideomotor learning plays an
integral role in the development of the body schema.
2.4 Mirror Mechanism & Object Affordances
Gallese and Sinigaglia also propose their own process of motor intentional development—
i.e., the process of acquiring praktognosia. They point to the evidence showing that
neonates and infants engage in social interactions to support the claim that the mini-
mal self is nurtured by interacting with ‘other bodies’. More precisely, their theory states
that social reciprocal capacities powered by the mirror neuron mechanism modulates the
28MerleauPonty, ibid., p.120-1.
29Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit.
30Gallese and Sinigaglia, ibid., p.749; see also Haggard, op. cit.
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minimal self. Mirror neurons encode both self actions and the actions of other people—
i.e., they discharge both when we perform an action and also when we observe the action
of others. In the early years of life, motor resonance produced by mirror neurons, facili-
tates ‘proto-conversation’ and imitation. These simple social interactions ‘promote the first
forms of motor (and emotional) attunement with other bodies enabling infants to carve
out their own [primitive] motor potentialities.’31
The mirror neuron mechanism is not only important in understanding action, but, more
interestingly, permits the possibility of understanding observed actions ‘from the inside’
and yield a ‘first-person grasp of another individual’s motor goals and intentions.’32 In
other words, these neurons provide a knowledge of motor actions distinct from both simple
action-effect associative mechanisms (i.e., void of motor representation) and inference.33
The contribution of motor intersubjectivity to the constitution of intentional goal directed
actions is, unsurprisingly, foreshadowed in the writing of MerleauPonty:
It is true that often knowledge of other people lights up the way to self-
knowledge: the spectacle outside him reveals to the child the meaning of its
own impulses, by providing them with an aim. But the instance would pass
unnoticed if it did not coincide with the inner possibilities of the child. The
sense of the gestures is not given, but understood, that is, recaptured by an
act on the spectator’s part. The whole difficulty is to conceive this act clearly
without confusing it with a cognitive operation. The communication or com-
prehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and
the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible in the conduct
of other people. It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and
mine his [emphasis added].34
The mirror neuron mechanism is what renders the development of this intentional action
understanding. To that end, Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, after conducting an extensive review
of the literature on mirror neurons, reiterate the conception of a minimal self grounded in
31Gallese and Sinigaglia, ibid., p.752-3.
32Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia, “The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit:
interpretations and misinterpretations”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, no.4 (2010): 264-274.
33Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese, “Neurophysiological mechanisms under-
lying the understanding and imitation of action”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2, no.9 (2001): 661-670.
To read more about the proposed role of inferential processing in understanding self and others, see Peter
Carruthers, “How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition”,
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009): 121-182.
34MerleauPonty, op. cit., p.215.
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motor possibilities—a conception where ‘we primarily experience ourselves and others in
terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively.’35
They begin by demonstrating that the mirror mechanism enables instinctive under-
standing of another person’s motor intentions. This is achieved by means of a special
type of neuron termed ‘action-constrained’ neurons. These neurons (recorded in monkeys)
are activated during specific actions but are fully activated when the associated action
is performed in the context of a specific goal. For instance, the neurons maximally fire
when a monkey grasps something to eat, but they partially fire when the primate grasps
the object in order to place it elsewhere. Importantly, a subset of these neurons are also
mirror neurons. The ‘action-constrained’ neurons with mirror properties maximally fire
when the monkey observes the specific goal directed action (e.g., grasping food to eat)
but not when the action is performed external to the associated goal (e.g., grasping to
simply displace). This selective activation allows these neurons to be predictive of inten-
tions underlying specific actions—i.e., they aid the observer in not only ascertaining the
action, but also provide information regarding why the action is performed.36 A slew of
brain imaging studies reveal that mirror networks also modulate action intentions in hu-
mans.37 Significantly, these mirror neuron networks present a cogent functional framework
for understanding the emergence of intentional goal directed actions in infants.38
In culminating their study, Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, arrive at the minimal sense of
self by considering affordances in the environment. The concept of affordance, introduced
by James Gibson, denotes the assortment of motor actions afforded by objects in the
surroundings.39 Affordance does not simply entail the physical properties of objects, but
refers to a property that involves both object and agent—i.e., the action possibilities that
35Corrado Sinigaglia and Giacomo Rizzolatti, “Through the looking glass: Self and others”, Conscious-
ness and Cognition 20, no.1 (2011): 64-74.
36Leonardo Fogassi, Pier Francesco Ferrari, Benno Gesierich, Stefano Rozzi, Fabian Chersi, and Giacomo
Rizzolatti, “Parietal Lobe: From Action Organization to Intention Understanding”, Science 308, no.5722
(2005): 662-667.
37A summary of the brain imaging studies is provided in Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, op. cit, p.68. Interest-
ingly, an EMG study indicated that children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) are unable to mirror
the motor intentions of others, their motor intention networks did not activate during action observation.
This would imply that these children have to understand the actions of others by means of inferential
processing rather than the more instinctive mirror mechanism. Luigi Cattaneo, Maddalena Fabbri-Destro,
Sonia Boria, Cinzia Pieraccini, Annalisa Monti, Giuseppe Cossu, and Giacomo Rizzolatti, “Impairment
of actions chains in autism and its possible role in intention understanding”, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 104, no.45 (2007): 17825-17830.
38Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit., p.753.
39James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Classic Edition: Psychology Press,
2014).
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a particular object presents to a particular agent. For instance, a walking cane offers sev-
eral motor possibilities to a person; they can use the cane to assist in walking or wield
the stick to defend themselves. Strikingly, evidence from neuroimaging studies and neu-
rophysiology shows that the visual perception of an object generates ‘the suitable set of
grasping-related motor representations’ irrespective of whether the person intends to inter-
act with the object.40 The implication being that object perception is ‘intertwined’ with
action prospects.
Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti argue that the characterization that ‘action constitutively
shapes the content of perception’ leads to the impression that ‘we become aware of ourselves
as of the selves that can grasp, throw or kick.’ More importantly, they proceed to state
that this ‘implies that we do not experience ourselves as a given entity (e.g. a physical
body) and then realize that such an entity can grasp or kick’, but on ‘perceiving something
as graspable or as kickable’ we become aware of ourselves as a motor potentiality.41 The
mirror mechanism not only cultivates this sense of self but enables us to see others in virtue
of their motor possibilities and actions (to the extent that their motor possibilities overlap
with ours).
We have seen from three differing approaches (ideomotor learning, the body schema,
and mirror neuron mechanism) that the minimal sense of self is formed enactively and
that this sense of self is distinguished by a motor intentionality—i.e., the self is expressed
as a motor capacity. Furthermore, the self as a ‘motor power’ is represented in the body
schema—a versatile and dynamic action-oriented model of the ‘body’. Interestingly, both
the body schema approach and the theory of ideomotor learning indicates that perceived
agency is a sense of ownership prompt. A plausible interpretation of this correlation may
be that the exercise of agency or the tangible perception of agential control, promotes
the engenderment of the phenomenological sentiment of ownership. To corroborate this
supposition, the next section will examine studies on body ownership in neuropsychology
and cognitive neuroscience. These studies will aid in elucidating the often indeterminate
relation between aspects of agency and the sense of ownership.
40Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, op. cit, p.70; see also Laila Craighero, Luciano Fadiga, Giacomo Rizzolatti,
and Carlo Umilta`, “Action for perception: A motor-visual attentional effect”, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 25, no.6 (1999): 1673-1692.
41Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, ibid, p.71.
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Chapter 3
Does Agency Modulate Ownership?
The precise relation between agency and ownership is a topic of continuing research and
debate. In the realm of neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience, there are two con-
tending positions on the causal constitution of the relationship. The first position states
that ownership and agency are ‘qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different
inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks.’1 A second view asserts that agency modu-
lates ownership—i.e., agency promotes the sense of ownership. This position is consistent
with the evidence reviewed delineating the emergence of the minimal self. In fact, the
second viewpoint corresponds to the hypothesis derived from the body schema approach
and theory of ideomotor learning, proclaiming that perceived agency induces ownership.
In this segment of the paper, I expound on an assortment of studies to support the latter
point of view and validate the supposition derived in the preceding section.
3.1 Evidence From Atypical Neuropsychological
Experiences
In order to gauge the connection between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership,
it is instructive to begin by exploring the relationship between self-awareness of actions
and sense of limb ownership. Investigating precisely this association, Baier and Karnath
examined hemiparetic stroke patients with defective perception of their motor weakness—
anosognosia for hemiparesis/hemiplegia (AHP). In particular, they wanted to determine
1Manos Tsakiris, Matthew R. Longo, and Patrick Haggard, “Having a body versus moving your body:
Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership,” Neuropsychologia 48, no.9 (2010): 2740-2749.
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whether individuals with ‘disturbed awareness for their motor weakness’ would also display
atypical ‘perceptions of the affected limb(s)’. They discovered that 92 percent of examined
patients with AHP ‘showed additional disturbed sensation of limb ownership (DSO) for
the paretic/plegic limb.’ Specifically, patients with AHP did not only have disturbances
in the awareness of their motor weakness, but also manifested feelings of disownership
and estrangement towards the affected limb(s). The observed association provides strong
evidence that the sense of body ownership and self-awareness of actions (the perception of
agency) are ‘tightly linked.’2
An extensive review on somatoparaphrenia yielded a comparable correlation between
disturbed body ownership and deficits in the motor intentional system. Somatoparaphrenia
involves delusional beliefs regarding contralesional body parts—people with somatopara-
phrenia generally either deny ownership of the affected body part(s) or defer ownership
to someone else. In 2009, Vallar and Ronchi surveyed reports of 56 patients (dating back
to 1893) with hemispheric lesions and symptoms of somatoparaphrenia.3 Based on their
investigation, they concluded that proprioceptive (related to the sense of body position
and movement) impairments, and not tactile or visual field defects, causatively contribute
to the onset of somatoparaphrenia. The reasoning for this connection, according to Val-
lar and Ronchi, is that proprioceptive feedback ‘is closely related to, and dependent on,
movement, and may be a basic component of the sense of ownership.’
Supplementing the notion that defective motor intentional structures are involved in
somatoparaphrenia, the review points to the fact that placing the affected body part in the
region of space not suffering neglect (the ipsilesional side) does not alleviate somatopara-
phrenia. As noted by Gallese and Sinigaglia, the denial of body part(s) ownership inde-
pendent of actual spatial position, implicates the body schema. This is because the body
schema is not ‘uniquely conceived as a spatial map of different body parts’ but instead func-
tions ‘as the source of our potentiality for actions.’4 On this point, it is worth mentioning,
that in most cases somatoparaphrenia is coupled with ‘severe sensorimotor’ deficiencies.
Taken together, the findings from somatoparaphrenia lend powerful credence to the role of
motor intentional features in modulating body ownership. Notably, the complicity of the
body schema in somatoparaphrenia implies that the body schema is capable of influencing
the phenomenological sense of ownership.
2Bernhard Baier and Hans-Otto Karnath. “Tight Link Between Our Sense of Limb Ownership and Self-
Awareness of Actions.” Stroke 39, no.2 (2008): 486-488. In the conducted study, legion location implicated
the right posterior insula in producing the sense of limb ownership and self-awareness of actions.
3Giuseppe Vallar and Roberta Ronchi, “Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of the neu-
ropsychological literature”, Experimental Brain Research 192, no.3 (2009): 533-551.
4Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit., p.751.
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More evidence for the role of motor intentional networks in regulating body owner-
ship comes from researches into asomatognosia—the impression that parts of the body are
missing or that they have vanished from corporeal awareness. In an insightful case study,
Arzy et al. reported a patient with asomatognosia—segments of the patient’s left arm had
disappeared (the patient recounted being able to see through her left arm).5 Throughout
the experience, the patient was unable to move the affected arm. Subsequent behavioral
assessments showed that the patient had deficits in imagining the rotation of body parts.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results attributed these symptoms to damage in the
right premotor and motor cortices.6 The causal evidence gleaned from Arzy et al.’s case
report complements functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) based probes into body
ownership; they indicate that neural activity in the premotor cortex reflects limb owner-
ship.7 Neuroimaging of people with body integrity identity disorder (BIID) corroborates
the involvement of the motor cortices in the sense of ownership. BIID entails the absence
of the feeling of ownership for specific limb(s) and the accompanying desire to amputate
the affected body parts. In a study published on the topic, the feeling of disowership
in BIID correlated with decreased neural activation in the premotor cortex.8 Altogether,
these neuroimaging studies of irregular neuropsychological phenomenon inculpate motor
intentional networks in the basic sense of ownership.
5Shahar Arzy, Leila S. Overney, Theodor Landis, and Olaf Blanke, “Neural Mechanisms of Embodiment:
Asomatognosia Due to Premotor Cortex Damage”, Archives of Neurology 63, no.7 (2006): 1022-1025.
6It should be noted that asomatognosia is ordinarily associated with damage to the right posterior
parietal cortex; a fact acknowledged by Arzy et alia in their paper. To that end, there is complementary
evidence from a positron emission tomography (PET) study that the right posterior insula may have a
role in body ownership. Manos Tsakiris, Maike D. Hesse, Christian Boy, Patrick Haggard, and Gereon
R. Fink, “Neural Signatures of Body Ownership: A Sensory Network for Bodily Self-Consciousness”,
Cerebral Cortex 17, no.10 (2006): 2235-2244. Strikingly, there is considerable neuroimaging evidence
that links activity in the insular lobe to the experience of agency. Chloe Farrer, Nicolas Franck, Nicolas
Georgieff, Chris D. Frith, Jean Decety, and Marc Jeannerod, “Modulating the experience of agency: a
positron emission tomography study”, Neuroimage 18, no.2 (2003): 324-333; Chloe Farrer and Chris D.
Frith, “Experiencing Oneself vs Another Person as Being the Cause of an Action: The Neural Correlates
of the Experience of Agency”, Neuroimage 15, no.3 (2002): 596-603. More comprehensively, the role of
the right posterior insula in generating both the sense of body ownership and self-awareness of actions is
discernible in Baier and Karnath, op. cit.
7H. Henrik Ehrsson, Charles Spence, and Richard E. Passingham, “That’s My Hand! Activity in
Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb”, Science 305, no.5685 (2004): 875-877.
8Milenna T. van Dijk, Guido A. van Wingen, Anouk van Lammeren, Rianne M. Blom, Bart P. de
Kwaasteniet, H. Steven Scholte, and Damiaan Denys, “Neural Basis of Limb Ownership in Individuals
with Body Integrity Identity Disorder”, PLoS One 8, no.8 (2013): e72212.
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3.2 Evidence From The Rubber Hand Illusion & Self-
Recognition
Shifting attention away from abnormal neuropsychological experiences, it is equally worth
considering the informative research work on illusory body ownership. The paradigmatic
experimental design is the rubber hand illusion (RHI).9 In the experiment setup, the par-
ticipant’s hand is hidden from visual view and tactile stimulation is applied to a visible
rubber hand in conjunction to the unseen real hand. If the tactile stimulation applied to
the out of view real hand, and the visible rubber hand, is synchronous, the participant
experiences a shift in position (proprioceptive drift) of the real hand towards the position
of the rubber hand. In addition, the participant adjudges that the rubber hand is a part
of their body—i.e., they feel ownership towards the rubber hand.
The RHI framework is important in demonstrating the elasticity of the body schema—
showing that subjecting an individual to the appropriate visuotactile stimulation leads to
the embodiment of the rubber hand.10 Significantly, synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation
is not sufficient to cause the illusion; the illusory embodiment induced by visuo-tactile
stimulation is contingent on the congruency of the rubber hand with respect to the real
hidden hand.11 For instance, positioning the rubber hand perpendicular to the orientation
of the real hidden hand, extinguishes the illusion.
The dependence of the illusion on congruency denotes, as cogently argued by Gallese
and Sinigaglia, that the RHI is constrained by the ‘action-compatibility’ of the observed
rubber hand with that of the real hand: ‘If the dummy hand occupies a position in space
incompatible with the power for action intrinsic to the body schema, the illusion does
not occur.’12 This means that the RHI is not merely a product of Bayesian statistical
correlations, but instead, the illusion is regulated by the possibility of actions (generated
by the body schema) corresponding to the particular hand. In short, the rubber hand
9Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, “Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see”, Nature 391,
no.6669 (1998): 756.
10The RHI manipulates not only the phenomenal experience of body ownership and the concomitant
sense of position, but also alters the physiological regulation of the real hand. G. Lorimer Moseley,
Nick Olthof, Annemeike Venema, Sanneke Don, Marijke Wijers, Alberto Gallace, and Charles Spence,
“Psychologically induced cooling of a specific body part caused by the illusory ownership of an artificial
counterpart”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no.35 (2008): 13169-13173.
11Francesco Pavani, Charles Spence, and Jon Driver, “Visual Capture of Touch: Out-of-the-Body Expe-
riences with Rubber Gloves”, Psychological Science 11, no.5 (2000): 353-359; Manos Tsakiris and Patrick
Haggard, “The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited: Visuotactile Integration and Self-Attribution”, Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 31, no.1 (2005): 80-91.
12Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit., p.751.
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illusion vividly showcases the dependence of ownership on action potential characteristics;
validating the relationship gleaned from atypical neuropsychological experiences.
Indirect signatures of the sense of ownership, in particular self recognition and iden-
tification, are also mediated by agency. A shrewd study by Tsakiris et al. explored the
function of efferent information (neural signals conveying motor stimuli) in the recognition
of body parts.13 In the study, pressing a lever with the left hand resulted in the passive
extension of the participant’s right index finger. The lever was pressed (employing the
left hand) either by the experimenter (‘externally-generated action’) or the participant
(‘self-generated action’). Video feedback of the passive extension was altered so that the
participants were either observing their own right hand movement or someone else’s right
hand movement. In both cases (‘view own hand’ and ‘view other’s hand’), the hands
were covered in identical woolen gloves to make visual discrimination impossible. Remark-
ably, Tsakiris et al. discovered that the participants were able to distinguish their own
hand from someone else’s hand with greater accuracy when they produced the movement
themselves—self-recognition improved considerably when the passive displacement of the
right index finger was self-generated. Specifically, self-recognition performance increased
despite there being no difference in proprioceptive and visual information.
An identical conclusion was reached by Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach, and Gallagher in
their discussion of the same experiment: ‘Self-recognition was significantly more accurate
when subjects themselves were the authors of the action, even though visual and proprio-
ceptive information always specified the same posture, and despite the fact that subjects
judged the effects and not the action per se.’14 The findings of the study and correspond-
ing assessments are consistent with prior self-recognition research. A determinative study
conducted in 2002 exhibited that motor intentional knowledge regulated self-recognition
in conditions of scarce morphological information. In particular, congruence between pro-
prioceptive and visual signals, and movement recognition (based on matching visual and
efferent signals) led to self-recognition. Indicative of the later results unearthed by Tsakiris
et al., the experimenters (Esther van den Bos and Marc Jeannerod) found that the pres-
ence of movement overrode other sources of information (including spatial orientation of
the hand; i.e., proprioceptive information) and achieved near perfect recognition.15 The
evidence from self-recognition perception coincides with an astute neuroimaging inquiry
13Manos Tsakiris, Patrick Haggard, Nicolas Franck, Nelly Mainy, and Angela Sirigu, “A specific role for
efferent information in self-recognition”, Cognition 96, no.3 (2005): 215-231.
14Quoted in Manos Tsakiris, Simone Schu¨tz-Bosbach, and Shaun Gallagher, “On agency and body-
ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflections”, Consciousness and Cognition 16, no.3
(2007): 645-660, p.654-655; see also Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit., p.750.
15Esther Van Den Bos and Marc Jeannerod, “Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to
self-recognition”, Cognition 85, no.2 (2002): 177-187.
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into the bodily self, revealing that the capacity to differentiate self from others is partly
based on a sensorimotor representation.16
The role intentional action plays in the production of a coherent sense of ownership
is more explicitly discernible in a subsequent study by Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard.17
The RHI was induced through synchronous tactile stimulation to an individual finger in
three separate conditions: active finger movement (self-generated intentional action), pas-
sive finger movement, and (bare) tactile stimulation. With both passive finger movement
and simple tactile stimulation, the RHI was localized to the stimulated finger—i.e., there
was ‘fragmented body awareness.’ However, in the active finger movement condition, the
proprioceptive drift associated with the RHI extended to ‘the whole hand’. On the basis
of their results, Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard contend that ‘[w]hereas a purely proprio-
ceptive sense of body-ownership is local and fragmented’, a coherent and cohesive sense of
body ownership is produced with the incorporation of agency. Another study examining
the impact of movement on the RHI found that active synchronous movements produced
stronger illusory ownership effects than passive synchronous movements.18
Probing the effects of the RHI on action oriented representation(s) of the body, Newport
et al. showed that embodiment of a fake hand (induced by active touch) led to alterations
in the body schema (indicated by pointing errors).19 In the same vein, Riemer et alia
discovered that proprioceptive drifts measured with a pointing (motor) task, were larger
in rubber hand illusions induced via voluntary synchronous movement as compared with
those elicited by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.20 A study exploring virtual body
ownership illusion registered the same pattern. The illusory ownership was stronger when
generated by visuomotor synchronous stimulation as opposed to visuotactile synchronous
stimulation.21 In aggregate, these five studies firmly denote that illusory embodiment is
more robust when motor intentionality is involved.
16Francesca Ferri, Francesca Frassinetti, Martina Ardizzi, Marcello Costantini, and Vittorio Gallese, “A
Sensorimotor Network for the Bodily Self”, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 24, no.7 (2012): 1584-1595.
17Manos Tsakiris, Gita Prabhu, and Patrick Haggard, “Having a body versus moving your body: How
agency structures body-ownership”, Consciousness and Cognition 15, no.2 (2006): 423-432.
18Timothy Dummer, Alexandra Picot-Annand, Tristan Neal, and Chris Moore, “Movement and the
rubber hand illusion”, Perception 38, no.2 (2009): 271-280.
19Roger Newport, Rachel Pearce, and Catherine Preston, “Fake hands in action: embodiment and
control of supernumerary limbs”, Experimental Brain Research 204, no.3 (2010): 385-395.
20Martin Riemer, Dieter Kleinbo¨hl, Rupert Ho¨lzl, and Jo¨rg Trojan, “Action and perception in the rubber
hand illusion”, Experimental Brain Research 229, no.3 (2013): 383-393.
21Elena Kokkinara and Mel Slater, “Measuring the Effects through Time of the Influence of Visuomotor
and Visuotactile Synchronous Stimulation on a Virtual Body Ownership Illusion”, Perception 43, no.1
(2014): 43-58.
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Supplementing the findings on the observed interplay between movement and owner-
ship, Burin et al. administered the RHI on people with complete upper left limb hemiple-
gia (paralysis of left upper limb) and compared the effects with those measured in healthy
subjects during the same illusion. The results revealed that proprioceptive drift for the
affected hand was significantly greater than the proprioceptive drift perceived in healthy
individuals. This implies that lack of movement weakens the sense of body ownership,
occasioning a more flexible body representation, which in turn leads to the paretic hand
being more prone to the embodiment illusion.22 Remarkably, the unaffected (right) hand
of the hemiplegics, did not display substantial susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion.
A possible interpretation of the last result (proposed by Burin et al.) is that the ‘regular
and repeated overuse of the healthy arm’ generates increased ‘number of movement-related
signals’—leading to elevated body ownership. Consequently, the part of the body schema
pertaining to the unaffected arm becomes more rigid and the healthy hand becomes resis-
tant to illusory embodiment. Despite the ambiguity in interpreting the absence of illusory
effects when the unaffected arm of a hemiplegic is synchronously stimulated, on the whole,
the study clearly demonstrates that voluntary movement indeed ‘impacts’ ownership.
3.3 Denouement
The combined evidence from atypical neuropsychological experiences, the rubber hand il-
lusion, and self-recognition experiments substantiate the hypothesis gleaned from the body
schema approach and theory of ideomotor learning: i.e., agency modulates ownership and
perceived agency engenders ownership. This relationship between agency and ownership
is essential to understanding the phenomenological basis of non-corporeal object owner-
ship. That said, the asserted relation is agnostic on questions regarding the dissociability
of agency and ownership, and the possible effects of ownership on agency instead. As a
matter of fact, these issues are tangential to the theory of ownership I am developing—the
theory solely incorporates the fact that perceived agency and tangible motor intentional
‘power’ are capable of evoking the sense of ownership. Still, there is interesting empirical
work addressing such peripheral issues.
On the subject of ownership’s effects on agency, recent experimental evidence indicates
that the interaction of ownership and agency is indeed bidirectional. In particular, a study
demonstrated that illusory ownership of a rubber hand led to the sense of agency over
22Dalila Burin, Alessandro Livelli, Francesca Garbarini, Carlotta Fossataro, Alessia Folegatti, Patrizia
Gindri, and Lorenzo Pia, “Are Movements Necessary for the Sense of Body Ownership? Evidence from
the Rubber Hand Illusion in Pure Hemiplegic Patients”, PLoS One 10, no.3 (2015): e0117155.
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the actions performed by the fake hand. The self-attribution of the movement manifested
both explicitly (questionnaire responses) and implicitly (presence of sensory attenuation).23
Based on their results, the experimenters intimated that body ownership ‘entails’ motor
representations of movements. On dissociability of ownership and agency, there is much
confusion.24 Even schizophrenia, a neuropsychological disorder that is classically associ-
ated with a selective deficit in the sense of agency, does not manifest a clear dissociation
between agency and ownership. On the contrary, recent evidence identifies accompanying
disturbances in the sense of body ownership.25 The evidence is primarily derived from
experiments comparing the RHI in people with schizophrenia and control subjects. These
investigations found that the RHI is ‘quantitatively and qualitatively stronger’ in individ-
uals with schizophrenia—symbolizing a weakened sense of body ownership.26
As stated before, these parallel topics, though interesting, are not directly relevant to
the theory of ownership being presented. To develop the theory, all that is required is the
premise that perceived agency generates the non-conceptual sense of ownership—a premise
that is evident from the neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience literature surveyed
above.
23Dalila Burin, Maria Pyasik, Adriana Salatino, and Lorenzo Pia, “That’s my hand! Therefore, that’s
my willed action: How body ownership acts upon conscious awareness of willed actions”, Cognition 166
(2017): 164-173.
24On the potential dissociation of body ownership and agency, see Appendix A for a compact overview.
25For a review, see Maayke Klaver, and H. Chris Dijkerman, “Bodily Experience in Schizophrenia:
Factors Underlying a Disturbed Sense of Body Ownership”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10 (2016):
305.
26Katharine N. Thakkar, Heathman S. Nichols, Lindsey G. McIntosh, and Sohee Park, “Disturbances in
Body Ownership in Schizophrenia: Evidence from the Rubber Hand Illusion and Case Study of a Sponta-
neous Out-of-Body Experience”, PloS One 6, no.10 (2011): e27089; see also Avi Peled, Michael Ritsner,
Shmuel Hirschmann, Amir B. Geva, and Ilan Modai, “Touch feel illusion in schizophrenic patients”, Bio-




A case study reported in 1996, described a woman with delusional disownership of her
left hand (somatoparaphrenia) due to right brain damage.1 In addition to the hand itself,
the patient displayed selective disownership of objects typically associated with the left
hand—i.e., the denial of ownership extended to extracorporeal objects that were ‘related’
to the affected hand (e.g., rings). Notably, this delusional disownership of objects only
manifested when the articles were viewed on the affected hand itself (e.g., when she wore
the objects on her left hand)—in contrast, the objects were correctly recognized by the
patient as belonging to her, when viewed on her right hand, or in the hands of the examiner.
Personal objects that were not ordinarily associated with the disowned hand were correctly
recognized by the patient irrespective of where they were viewed.
This remarkable case study lucidly intimates that the body schema is capable of altering
ownership perceptions. It also suggests that systematic associations between the embodied
self and object, shape and strengthen these perceptions. And finally, the study depicts
the strong interconnectedness between the sense of ownership and memory—the patient
couldn’t recall the autobiographical information related to the object when seeing it on
the left affected hand; whereas by simply moving the object to the right hand, the patient
recognized the object and retrieved the related memories. In addendum to the palpable
relationship between perceived agency and ownership (i.e., perceived agency promotes the
sense of ownership), these conceptions are integral to understanding non-corporeal object
ownership. Moreover, as we will see, they are essential constituents of a comprehensive
theory of ownership.
1Salvatore Aglioti, Nicola Smania, Michela Manfredi, and Giovanni Berlucchi, “Disownership of left
hand and objects related to it in a patient with right brain damage”, Neuroreport 8, no.1 (1996): 293-296.
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4.1 Object Embodiment
In probing the origins of non-corporeal object ownership, it should be emphasized that the
body schema is a functional representation that extends beyond the body to objects in the
external world—a mechanism of directed action (or an instrument to transform will into
action). To that end, there is overwhelming evidence that the body schema incorporates
external (physical) objects—i.e., the body schema can expand to embody objects that
are not naturally part of the body. This integration of body and objects is commonplace
in humans; it is also observable in monkeys. In a condensed review, Maravita and Irki
examined empirical evidence denoting transformations in the body schema during (and
immediately after) tool use. They inspected behavioral markers and neuronal recordings
in primates during tool activity. In humans (including brain damaged patients), they
explored behavioral manifestations of body schema alterations. The combined evidence
presented in the review signifies that the body schema is updated during the usage of an
instrument—the tool becomes incorporated into the putative ‘body in the brain’.2 In the
ensuing paragraphs, I examine the evidence presented in the review of Maravita and Irki,
and more recent studies, that delineate the incorporation of paraphernalia into the body
schema. The evaluated studies vividly establish the synthesis of body and object within
the schema.
As briefly mentioned in Section I (during the discussion on the body schema), neuro-
physiological studies in primates have identified bimodal neuron networks in the ventral
premotor cortex (possessing both somatosensory and visual receptive fields) that dynam-
ically track peripersonal space—these visual receptive fields (vRFs) move in synchrony
with the associated body part (e.g., they are anchored to the arm) and not the eye.3 In
an important study, Iriki et alia displayed, that after training macaque monkeys to use an
instrument for weeks, bimodal neurons in the trained macaque’s caudal postcentral gyrus
could also track the space surrounding the instrument during active use.4 These findings
show that the neurons comprising the body schema subsume tools during active use—i.e.,
the space around the non-corporeal instrument is coded in the same manner as the space
near the body.
Additional studies have reported equivalent findings (i.e., the expansion of these bi-
2Angelo Maravita, and Atsushi Iriki, “Tools for the body (schema)”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8,
no.2 (2004): 79-86.
3Michael S. Graziano, Gregory S. Yap, and Charles G. Gross, “Coding of visual space by premotor
neurons”, Science 266, no.5187 (1994): 1054-1057; see also Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallese, op. cit.
4Atsushi Iriki, Michio Tanaka, and Yoshiaki Iwamura, “Coding of modified body schema during tool
use by macaque postcentral neurones”, Neuroreport 7, no.14 (1996): 2325-2330.
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modal receptive fields to include visual space accessible with the instrument) immediately
after instrument use.5 To emphasize, these studies symbolize that the body schema (Mer-
leauPonty’s ‘motor intentionality’) can extend to include external objects. Interestingly,
a later investigation using light and electron microscopy revealed the emergence of novel
functional neural connections in prefrontal areas (including the intraparietal area) of mon-
keys that underwent training in tool use.6
A remarkable study by Iriki, Tanaka, Obayashi, and Iwamura replicated the extension
of the body schema to encompass virtual objects.7 In their experimental setup, the monkey
performed tool use by observing visual feedback from a video monitor (direct observation
was prevented by an opaque plate). After the requisite training, the visual receptive fields
corresponding to the bimodal neurons in the monkey’s intraparietal cortex, ‘projected’
to incorporate the virtual hand (corresponding to the real hand) on the video monitor.
Furthermore, immediately ensuing tool use, the visual receptive fields coding the image of
the hand on the monitor, extended to incorporate the virtual tool—i.e., the vRFs expanded
to encompass the length of the virtual instrument. More surprisingly, the compression and
displacement of the virtual hand (i.e., the image of the hand) prompted corresponding
changes to the visual receptive fields of these bimodal neurons. The modification to the
vRFs materialized despite no changes to the actual posture, position, and size of the real
hand. Markedly, the same visual receptive fields coalesced around the instrument tip (‘akin
to a computer cursor’) when every other image was filtered out (including the remainder
of the instrument).
According to Maravita and Irki, the results signify that the virtual (functional) coun-
terparts of the hand and instrument become an extension of the monkey’s body. This
body extension is not merely functional in nature; there is perhaps an element of owner-
ship over the virtual hand as depicted by the fact that the monkey retracts the real hand
when a threat is presented near the image. Maravita and Irki suggest that these neu-
rons might represent the neural correlates of the ‘distal presence’ felt during teleoperators
(e.g., a controllable robot) and contingent virtual displays (e.g., controllable video game
character).8
5Maravita and Iriki, op. cit., p.79-80.
6Sayaka Hihara, Tomonori Notoya, Michio Tanaka, Shizuko Ichinose, Hisayuki Ojima, Shigeru
Obayashi, Naotaka Fujii, and Atsushi Iriki, “Extension of corticocortical afferents into the anterior bank
of the intraparietal sulcus by tool-use training in adult monkeys”, Neuropsychologia 44, no.13 (2006):
2636-2646.
7Atsushi Iriki, Michio Tanaka, Shigeru Obayashi, and Yoshiaki Iwamura, “Self-images in the video
monitor coded by monkey intraparietal neurons”, Neuroscience Research 40, no.2 (2001): 163-173.
8Maravita and Iriki, op. cit., p.81; see also Jack M. Loomis, “Distal Attribution and Presence”, Pres-
ence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments 1, no.1 (1992): 113-119.
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Inquiries into tool usage in humans reveal the existence of analogous body schema
based extension mechanisms. A study by Berti and Frassinetti, involving a patient that
had suffered a right-hemisphere stroke, demonstrated that visual neglect restricted to the
space surrounding body parts (peripersonal space) could be extended to distant spaces by
artificially extending the patient’s body by means of wielding a rod (i.e., the visual neglect
would extend to areas surrounding the rod upon use of the long implement)—indicating
that external objects become incorporated in the ‘body’ representation.9
Equivalent effects can be discerned in patients (typically with brain damage) suffering
from cross modal extinction. These patients ignore sensory stimuli of a specific modality
(e.g., tactile stimulus) on the contralesional side (opposite side of the lesion) when a stimuli
of a different modality (e.g., visual stimulus) is presented simultaneously on the ipsilesional
side (same side of the lesion). Interestingly, the extinction of the contralesional tactile stim-
uli is moderated by the distance of the ipsilesional visual stimuli—i.e., the closer the visual
probe is to the ipsilesional hand, the greater the tactile extinction on the contralesional
hand.10 Singularly, Maravita and colleagues discovered that the distance effect is attenu-
ated by holding a stick with the ipsilesional hand to touch the distant visual stimuli—i.e.,
the decrease in extinction is eroded by wielding a stick to touch the ipsilesional visual
probe. The attenuation of the distance effect when wielding a reaching stick signals the
extension of the peripersonal space to also include space around the tool. In effect, the tool
is integrated into the body map. Moreover, the effect could not be replicated by merely
placing the stick near the ipsilesional hand (tangible control over the stick via wielding was
necessary).11
Since the prominent review by Maravita and Irki, there have been more direct studies
on tool induced changes to the body schema in humans. An important study conducted
by Cardinali et alia explicitly demonstrated that the kinematics of movement are modified
after using a mechanical grabber—i.e., the kinematics of a person’s empty hand (without
the mechanical grabber) became distorted, as if their arm had lengthened, after perform-
ing actions with a mechanical grabber that increased reach. The altered arm kinematics
observed in the study represent changes to the action oriented body schema. In particu-
lar, localized touches conveyed by the subjects to the elbow, and middle fingertip of their
9Anna Berti and Francesca Frassinetti, “When Far Becomes Near: Remapping of Space by Tool Use”
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 12, no.3 (2000): 415-420.
10Giuseppe di Pellegrino, Elisabetta La`davas, and Alessandro Farne´, “Seeing where your hands are”,
Nature 388, no.6644 (1997): 730.
11Angelo Maravita, Masud Husain, Karen Clarke, and Jon Driver, “Reaching with a tool extends vi-
sualtactile interactions into far space: Evidence from cross-modal extinction”, Neuropsychologia 39, no.6
(2001): 580-585.
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arm, corresponded to an increase in the arm length representation—the arm morphol-
ogy represented in the schema had been expanded to incorporate the external reaching
instrument.12
Significantly, the modified motor behavior ensuing the use of the mechanical grabber,
lasted (at the minimum) for the duration of the ‘post-tool’ monitoring period (approxi-
mately 10 to 15 minutes), and occured without any training in wielding the mechanical
grabber. This rapid change in motor based representation stands in contrast to lower pri-
mates that require a period of training. A possible explanation may be that ‘evolutionary
pressure’ triggered full expression of primitive ‘body’ integrating features in humans—
features that would have been present in some common ancestor. This precursor would
exist today in closely related primates, explaining the capability of macaque monkeys to
embody external objects into their body representation only after some familiarity with
the object. On the other hand, in humans, the fully developed body schema is capable of
embodying objects almost instantaneously. There is evidence that this difference in elas-
ticity of body representation corresponds to expanded prefrontal and intraparietal areas in
humans as compared with monkeys.13
4.2 Glimpsing Ownership in Afterimages
In addition to studies focusing on kinematics of action, the afterimage experimental paradigm
is also useful in probing the incorporation of objects into the body schema. More impor-
tantly, the paradigm provides the basis to connect, integration of objects into the body
schema, with the subjective feeling of ownership over embodied objects. In an afterimage
experiment, participants in a dark room are exposed to a brief light flash, the momen-
tary flash creates an enduring afterimage of the whole field of view, moreover, when the
afterimage contains a body part, the body part ‘fades’ or ‘crumbles’ when it is displaced
(actively or passively) from its manifest position in the afterimage, however the rest of the
afterimage remains intact.14
12Lucilla Cardinali, Francesca Frassinetti, Claudio Brozzoli, Christian Urquizar, Alice C. Roy, and
Alessandro Farne`, “Tool-use induces morphological updating of the body schema”, Current Biology 19,
no.12 (2009): R478-R479.
13Maravita and Iriki, op. cit., p.80; see also Guy A. Orban, David Van Essen, and Wim Vanduffel,
“Comparative mapping of higher visual areas in monkeys and humans”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8,
no.7 (2004): 315-324.
14P Davies, “Effects of Movements upon the Appearance and Duration of a Prolonged Visual Afterimage:
1. Changes Arising from the Movement of a Portion of the Body Incorporated in the Afterimaged Scene”,
Perception 2, no.2 (1973): 147-153.
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In a remarkable study, Hogendoorn et alia discovered that the disruption of the after-
image can be completely inhibited by ‘disowning’ the limb present in the field of view—the
subjective feeling of ownership over the limb is decreased (or eliminated) by relocating the
limb during the brief period of time between the end of the flash of light and formation of
the afterimage.15 The findings by Hogendoorn et alia suggest that the afterimage disrup-
tion is not simply a result of the conflict between vision and proprioception, but that it is
also influenced by the higher-order subjective feeling of ownership.
In the same vein, a novel study by Ritchie and Carlson replicated the disruption effect in
afterimages of mirror reflections—the afterimage comprised of reflections of the subject’s
arm using both (alternatively) a frontally placed mirror and mirror box. Ritchie and
Carlson posit that the ‘crumbling’ effect observed in their experiment is partially explained
by the subject’s ‘sense of ownership’ towards its reflection and bodily self-awareness.16
These two singular afterimage studies suggest that the crumbling effect is modulated by the
subjective feeling of ownership—movement is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition; to
actually take place, the crumbling effect requires a feeling of ownership towards the active
object represented in the image.
The derived determinant for the crumbling effect (i.e., the subjective feeling of owner-
ship) is going to be important when considering rapid first-order extensions (integration of
objects that are held directly) of the body schema in the afterimage experimental paradigm.
In that regard, there have been several significant experiments conducted. The principal
among these is a clever study by Carlson, Alvarez, Wu, and Verstraten.17 They carried
out an afterimage based experimental study to demonstrate the rapid incorporation of
first-order objects into the body schema. In the study, both object and hand would fade
from the afterimage after displacement from its envisaged position. Additionally, an object
held by the subject faded from the afterimage upon being dropped. Inversely, objects also
faded when the observer grasped the object and displaced it from the area incorporated
in the afterimage. These results demonstrate that external objects were rapidly (‘within a
few seconds’) integrated into the body schema.18
15Hinze Hogendoorn, Marjolein PM Kammers, Thomas A. Carlson, and Frans AJ Verstraten, “Being
in the dark about your hand: Resolution of visuo-proprioceptive conflict by disowning visible limbs”,
Neuropsychologia 47, no.13 (2009): 2698-2703.
16Ritchie, J. Brendan and Thomas Carlson, “Mirror, mirror, on the wall, is that even my hand at all?
Changes in the afterimage of one’s reflection in a mirror in response to bodily movement”, Neuropsychologia
48, no.5 (2010): 1495-1500.
17Thomas A. Carlson, George Alvarez, Daw-an Wu, and Frans AJ Verstraten, “Rapid Assimilation of
External Objects Into the Body Schema”, Psychological Science 21, no.7 (2010): 1000-1005.
18Notably, the study failed to detect fading for second-order objects (i.e., a ball held using a mechanical
arm). Conversely, a recent study by Rademaker et alia replicated the fading effect for second-order objects
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Though not examined in the paper, according to the evidence from the previous af-
terimage studies (Hogendoorn et alia, and Ritchie and Carlson), the subjective sense of
ownership mediates the crumbling effect. Applying that constraint to the current study,
the observed crumbling effect not only denotes that the external object was incorporated
into the body schema, but that the process of embodiment extends the phenomenological
experience of body ownership to the encompassed object. To reiterate, the afterimage ex-
periment paradigm provides indirect evidence that incorporating objects into the schema,
may also involve a (transient) non-conceptual sense of ownership towards the incorporated
object—the same non-conceptual sense of body ownership that comprises the minimal self.
4.3 The Phenomenology of Object Ownership
There is considerable direct evidence for the above hypothesis (connecting the body schema
and perceived agency, to the subjective feeling of ownership). In a formative study, Fay
Short and Robert Ward examined the distinctive coding of body (personal) space—the
external region of space ‘occupied by our body’ and corresponding to the body schema.19
They conducted a series of experiments involving virtual limbs (hands or cones) to deter-
mine the properties required to provoke the distinctive coding of space that enables efficient
motor movements. The results revealed that visual space controlled by a person (‘visual
space subject to predictable consequences from movement’) garnered a distinctive spatial
code. Therefore, stimuli located within the controlled visual space resulted in faster motor
responses than stimuli presented just outside this space. In addition, Short and Ward
found that the appearance of the virtual limb, and the spatial correspondence between
visual and proprioceptive feedback, did not modulate the distinctive coding of the virtual
object.
To emphasize, predictable control was the governing factor in extending the body
schema—perceptual features of the virtual limb, and spatial correspondence between the
(cotton balls held using chopsticks) — denoting ‘second-order extensions’ of the body schema. The fading
effect for second-order objects increased as a function of familiarity with the first-order tool—a parallel
situation to that of first-order extensions in macaques. A plausible conjecture that can be drawn is that
humans have evolved a rapid capacity for first-order body extensions but use analogous neural learning
processes to that employed by macaque monkeys for higher order body extensions. Rosanne L. Rademaker,
Daw-An Wu, Ilona M. Bloem, and Alexander T. Sack, “Intensive tool-practice and skillfulness facilitate
the extension of body representations in humans”, Neuropsychologia 56 (2014): 196-203.
19Fay Short and Robert Ward, “Virtual Limbs and Body Space: Critical Features for the Distinction
Between Body Space and Near-Body Space”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance 35, no.4 (2009): 1092-1103.
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seen virtual object and the felt real hand, possessed no bearing on the incorporation of the
virtual object into the distinctive spatial code. Intriguingly, analysis of the results showed
that participants not only experienced subjective agency, but also ownership of the virtual
limb, in those experiments where they had objective control over the simulated object. In
light of their results, Short and Ward hypothesized that the body schema is capable of
incorporating any controllable ‘space or objects’ and that that ‘may make an individual
feel as though the object has become a part of his/her own body.’
The results of Short and Ward are an explicit demonstration that objective agency does
not simply lead to object incorporation (into the body schema) in order to facilitate actions,
but in addition, the perceived agency engenders the subjective feeling of ownership towards
the integrated object. This hypothesis is corroborated by subsequent studies. In particular,
an innovative study by Ma and Hommel showed that the phenomenological experience of
‘body ownership’ is conceived for ‘actively operated non-corporeal objects.’20 Specifically,
participants controlled virtual balloons, and virtual squares by moving their real hand—
i.e., the hand and the virtual object moved in synchrony. In addition, participants could
change the size of the virtual balloon (by opening and closing their hand), and either the
size or color of the virtual square. This agential control over the virtual (non-corporeal)
object garnered a sense of body ownership, in addition to a subjective sense of agency,
towards the operated object. Though, not a necessary condition, the ownership illusion was
stronger when the virtual object and the real hand appeared spatially close and connected.
This signals that the phenomenological sense of ownership is moderated by gestalt laws of
proximity and continuity.21
To reiterate, the study revealed that body ownership extends to objects whose ‘behav-
ior’ or ‘relevant features’ are controlled. This confirms the hypothesis that the phenomeno-
logical sense of ownership is ‘perceived’ for any arbitrary object that expresses the person’s
intentions (particularly if there is a semblance of physical connection between object and
person).
A follow up study by Ma and Hommel set out to corroborate the role of objective agency
in ownership perceptions. They compared virtual illusions induced through synchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation, with those induced via synchronous visuo-motor stimulation (i.e.,
through maintaining objective control of the effector). They found that agency strength-
ened the sense of ownership—i.e., synchrony based ownership perceptions are modulated
20Ke Ma and Bernhard Hommel, “Body-ownership for actively operated non-corporeal objects”, Con-
sciousness and Cognition 36 (2015): 75-86.
21Ma and Hommel, op. cit., p.84. For an introduction to gestalt psychology, see Kurt Koffka, Principles
of Gestalt psychology (Routledge 2013).
34
by objective agency.22 Interestingly, they also discovered that agency played a greater
role when the virtual object didn’t resemble a body part (e.g., a green rectangle). In the
case of the passive virtual hand, the visual resemblance with the participant’s real hand
compensated for the lack of objective control.
In order to consolidate the findings on non-corporeal object ownership into a more sys-
tematic theoretical framework, and because of the interplay between perceived ownership
and agency, Ma et alia conducted a study to determine if Wegner’s three criteria for the
experience of conscious will extended to the perception of ownership.23 Wegner’s three
principles mediating causality perception are priority, consistency, and exclusivity—these
principles enable us to ‘draw the inference that our thought has caused our action’. Aspects
of the three criteria could be traced to Hume’s work on causation.24
The first two principles, priority and consistency, are already discernible in illusory
ownership studies. Adequate temporal synchrony, required to engender virtual object
embodiment, is a manifestation of the priority principle—intimating a connection between
motor intentions and action effects. The moderation of illusory ownership perception due
to factors such as natural connectivity between object and person, can be classified as
a facet of the consistency principle—i.e., the effects are consistent with the action. In
their study, Ma et alia demonstrated that Wegner’s final principle, exclusivity, also had a
pronounced effect on virtual object ownership—i.e., ownership perception increases when
there is certainty that the movement of the controlled virtual object does not have a
plausible alternative cause.
The results of this last study provides us with an integrated framework to analyze own-
ership and agency experiences. In particular, Wegner’s principles allows us to apprehend,
that with the proper multisensory integration and presence of action-compatibility, even a
discrete volume of space can be embodied.25 It appears that the class of non-corporeal ob-
jects that can be embodied, and over which ownership can be experienced, is not critically
constrained by physical features—more precisely, physical characteristics of the object do
not constitute a fundamental variable (i.e., a variable that cannot be reduced into more
primitive variables).
22Ke Ma and Bernhard Hommel, “The role of agency for perceived ownership in the virtual hand
illusion”, Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015): 277-288.
23Ke Ma, Bernhard Hommel, and Hong Chen, “The roles of consistency and exclusivity in perceiving
body ownership and agency”, Psychological Research (2018): 1-10; Daniel M. Wegner, “The mind’s best
trick: how we experience conscious will”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, no.2 (2003): 65-69.
24Wegner, ibid., p.67-8.
25Arvid Guterstam, Giovanni Gentile, and H. Henrik Ehrsson, “The invisible hand illusion: multisen-
sory integration leads to the embodiment of a discrete volume of empty space”, Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience 25, no.7 (2013): 1078-1099.
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In fact, there is evidence from the RHI that the exact opposite is the case. Longo et alia
discovered that objective similarity (skin luminance, hand morphology, and third person
hand similarity ratings) between the rubber hand and the subject’s real hand did not
influence the illusion, but embodiment of the rubber hand lead to perceived similarity.26
Importantly, the increase in perceived similarity was selectively linked to the subjective
experiences of ownership and agency; not to the proprioceptive drift associated with the
illusion. This salient finding implies that the subjective feeling of ownership is deeply
interwoven with self perception. Indeed, it suggests that the experience of ownership is
powerful enough to alter perception in a way that attributes certain self features to the
possessed object.
The sentiment that possessions mirror particular qualities of their owner (to themselves,
and to others) is not an uncommon notion in the annals of philosophy and psychology. In
Being and Nothingness, Sartre remarks that ‘the totality of my possessions reflects the
totality of my being ... I am what I have ... What is mine is myself’.27 In the same vein,
William James notes that the the ‘line’ between the conceptions of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ is often
‘difficult to draw’:
In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that
he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and
his house ... his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and
bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and
prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down,
- not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way
for all.28
The palpable impression that owned objects are assimilated into the self image is cor-
roborated by the implicit association test (IAT) paradigm.. In an original study, Nicole
LeBarr and Judith Shedden employed a new version of the IAT to assess implicit cogni-
tive associations between self concepts and owned objects.29 In trials where self related
words required the same response key as the color corresponding to self-owned objects,
26Matthew R. Longo, Friederike Schu¨u¨r, Marjolein PM Kammers, Manos Tsakiris, and Patrick Haggard,
“Self awareness and the body image”, Acta Psychologica 132, no.2 (2009): 166-172.
27Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology [1943], (New York:
Philosophical Library 1956), p.591-2
28William James, op. cit, p.183.
29Nicole LeBarr, and Judith M. Shedden, “Psychological ownership: The implicit association between
self and already-owned versus newly-owned objects”, Consciousness and Cognition 48 (2017): 190-197.
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the response times were significantly faster. Interestingly, there was no marked difference
in response times between trials with ‘already-owned’ and ‘newly-owned’ objects. This
denotes that cognitive associations are formed rapidly (within minutes) between the self
and newly-owned objects. According to LeBarr and Shedden (and in accordance with the
precepts of the theory developed in this paper), a possible mechanism that enables the
rapid formation of these self-object associations is the act of physically grasping or using
the object.
In addition to manufacturing self-object psychological associations, ownership has an
appreciable effect on the visuomotor system. A study by Constable, Kritikos, and Bayliss
demonstrated that ownership status influenced grasping actions and perception of object
affordances. In their study, participants performed a stimulus-response compatibility task
with mugs—i.e., subjects reacted to stimuli presented on mug handles. As predicted, par-
ticipants responded quicker to the stimulus when the response location was in the same
direction as the mug handle. Importantly, the compatibility effect was abolished when
the mug belonged to the experimenter—the affordances provided by the mug handle were
suppressed when the subject knew that the mug was another person’s personal property.
Furthermore, the study revealed that subjects performed lifting actions differently de-
pending on who owned the mug. In the case of their own mug, they lifted the mug more
forcefully (relatively greater acceleration) and moved it closer to themselves. Alternatively,
when handling the experimenter’s mug, subjects were more cautious (lower accelerations)
during the lifting movement and the trajectory was slightly biased towards the location of
the experimenter.30
I have now completed the review of empirical evidence delineating the foundations of
the theory. To summarize, the phenomenological sense of ownership is a powerful neurocog-
nitive phenomenon. It is capable of altering phenomenal perceptions, object affordances,
and motor intentionality (reflected in changes to the visuomotor system)—most notably,
these effects take place within minutes of ownership induction. Equally important, the
cognitive processes leading to the inception of ownership are based on three interrelated
precepts. The most foundational concept is that perceived agency over an object induces
the sense of ownership. This principle is evident in studies where subjects feel ownership
towards objects that they objectively control. In addition, the perceived agency rule is
modulated by three gestalt-like principles: priority, consistency, and exclusivity.
The second rule relates to the body schema. Incorporation of an object into the body
schema (e.g., by grasping the object) leads to a non-conceptual sense of ownership towards
30Merryn D. Constable, Ada Kritikos, and Andrew P. Bayliss, “Grasping the concept of personal prop-
erty”, Cognition 119, no.3 (2011): 430-437.
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the integrated object. This is evidenced by the synthesis of tool incorporation literature
and the afterimage paradigm, and aspects of the epochal case study reported by Aglioti,
Smania, Manfredi, and Berlucchi. In addition, the inextricable relation between action
control and the body schema (i.e., the body schema enables volitional actions) means that
the integration of an object into the schema is a neurocognitive primer to object control.
The inherent relation between objective control and the body schema is identifiable in the
results obtained by Short and Ward.
The final cognitive process underpinning the theory is the rapid formation of self-object
associations immediately ensuing the inception of ownership. The associations are likely
strengthened over time as suggested by the case study discussed at the beginning of the
chapter. These psychological associations form the basis for a range of ownership related
phenomenon—including the endowment effect (overvaluing objects that are owned) and
the mere ownership effect (evaluating owned items more positively).31
4.4 Hegelian Elements or (The Repudiation of
Conventionalism)
Integrating the three cognitive precepts of ownership attained in the last section with emer-
gent aspects of the minimal self, it becomes evident that property acquisition is a natural
correlate of processes leading to the development of self perception and representation. To
see this, recollect that the theory of ideomotor learning stipulates that voluntary action
is attained through continual motor interactions with the physical environment. Add to
that the fact that visual perception of an object generates the range of possible actions
afforded by the object—i.e., our perception of objects are intrinsically action oriented. To-
gether, this means that during the requisite exploratory movements leading to voluntary
action acquisition, children and infants will inevitably incorporate objects into their body
schema. They will form action and effect associations corresponding to these objects—in
part, aided by the mirror mechanism. Eventually, the infants will learn to intentionally
operate objects frequently present in their environment.
According to the perceived agency principle, these important developmental interac-
tions yield the nascent instances of non-corporeal object ownership. Namely, embody-
ing objects (by way of the body schema) and exercising objective control over things
31Bertram Gawronski, Galen V. Bodenhausen, and Andrew P. Becker, “I like it, because I like myself:
Associative self-anchoring and post-decisional change of implicit evaluations”, Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 43, no.2 (2007): 221-232.
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leads to the subjective experience of ownership. In addition, after the inception of own-
ership towards these objects, the mind forms rapid self-object associations (associative
self-anchoring). These associations strengthen and intensify over time if the object re-
mains in the child’s possession. As noted by Susan Sutherland Isaacs, the full-fledged
self-object associations may lead to the conspicuous perception on the part of the child
that ‘what is mine becomes (in my feelings) a part of ME.’32
These self construction processes reveal that the appearance of personal property is a
corollary of the minimal self. That is to say, children acquiring possessions is a normal
part of self development—somewhat akin to the acquisition of language.33 It follows that
the purely conventional account of property, asserting that there is no natural ‘mine’ or
‘thine’, is erroneous. In fact, the sense of ownership is a pervasive neurocognitive experience
that constitutes the basic sense of self. And as we have seen, this sense of ownership
often extends to extracorporeal objects—either by embodying the object and/or objectively
controlling the thing. In turn, this often leads to enduring self-object associations.
In this regard, developmental studies show that the concept of ownership rights emerges
in children at ages 2- to 3-years—i.e., 2- to 3-year olds begin to assert ownership rights over
their personal possessions.34 The process of acquiring these ownership concepts originates
much earlier, at around 9 months of age, when infants start to form triadic relationships
that ‘that links self, people, and objects in the environment.’35 Interestingly, children
uphold ownership rights and side with owners over non-owners in disputes much more
strongly and consistently than adults—during ownership disputes, adults also take into
account alternative entitlement principles such as continued use and duty to share.36 The
stringent adherence to ownership rights displayed by children (in contrast to adults) does
not conform with purely conventional and learning accounts of property. Indeed, stud-
ies suggest that the ownership rights inferred by children are an extension of the bodily
rights that they intuitively possess (a fact that conforms to the phenomenological the-
ory of ownership)—specifically, they do not distinguish between body parts and personal
property when making moral judgments about ownership.37
32Susan Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited
1933), p.225
33Noam Chomsky. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (MIT Press 2014).
34Shaylene E. Nancekivell, Julia W. Van de Vondervoort, and Ori Friedman, “Young Children’s Under-
standing of Ownership”, Child Development Perspectives 7, no.4 (2013): 243-247.
35Philippe Rochat, “Possession and Morality in Early Development,” New Directions for Child and
Adolescent Development 132 (2011): 3031.
36Karen R. Neary and Ori Friedman, “Young Children Give Priority to Ownership When Judging Who
Should Use an Object”, Child Development 85, no.1 (2014): 326-337.
37Julia W. Van de Vondervoort and Ori Friedman, “Parallels in Preschoolers’ and Adults’ Judgments
39
Additionally, there is evidence from certain linguistic and anthropological theories that
the concept of ownership is a universal feature of human languages and societies. The
strongest example of the former is the theory of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM).38
The theory stipulates the existence of ‘semantic primitives’ (or ‘primes’) that constitute
the semantic building blocks of all lexicon. The primes are universal (i.e., same meaning
in every human language) and primitive (i.e., they cannot be defined in terms of other
words). Terms denoting possession are amongst the list of proposed semantic primes. In
the latter domain, property is among the list of human universals (i.e., present universally
among humans) compiled by the anthropologist David Brown.39 Experimental studies
in nonhuman primates also favor theoretical accounts that involve a biological basis for
property—queer psychological features such as the endowment effect (overvaluing objects
that are owned by the subject) and pragmatic ownership behavior (e.g, bartering) have
been observed in other primates.40
Add to all this the fact that humans have the capacity to identify with others and engage
in prosocial behaviors, we see that systems of property rights do not require the sovereign
authority of the state to emerge (a position held by Hobbes and Bentham, among others).
People can devise property rules based on their shared perspective (‘shared evaluative
attitudes’), and the inherent human instinct to acquire possessions in order to adequately
express themselves.41
I will end the chapter by discussing the relevance of the Hegelian conception of property.
As noted in the introduction, elements of the property theory I’ve developed are analogous
to Hegel’s theory of property (absent the idealism and theory of historical development).
In particular, the Hegelian concept that property is the externalization of will or the em-
bodiment of personality, accords with the fact that the body schema enables action control
to extend beyond the body to objects in the external world. A person often expresses
their motor intentionality through operating embodied objects—e.g., incorporating tools
into the body schema to perform needed actions. This exercise of objective control over
embodied objects, mediated by the body schema, not only leads to the phenomenological
experience of ownership, but allows us to accomplish a variety of projects. In the Hegelian
framework, this would correspond to a person placing their will into an object, in order to
About Ownership Rights and Bodily Rights”, Cognitive Science 39, no.1 (2015): 184-198.
38Cliff Goddard, “The Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach”, in Bernd Heine and Heiko Narrog
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010): 459-484.
39Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill 1991).
40Sarah F. Brosnan, “Property in Nonhuman Primates,” New Directions for Child and Adolescent De-
velopment 132 (2011): 922.
41Michael Tomasello, and Amrisha Vaish, “Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality”, Annual Review
of Psychology 64 (2013): 231-255.
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realize their needs.
By being taken into possession, the thing acquires the predicate ‘mine’ and my
will is related to it positively ... The use of the thing is my need being externally
realized through the change, destruction, and consumption of the thing.42
In the passage, Hegel is saying that the use of an object ‘manifests the will of [the]
possessor’ by revealing how the object fits into the person’s projects and intentions.43 To
that end, Hegel considers that physically grasping an object is ‘the most complete of these
modes [of possession], because then I am directly present in this possession, and therefore
my will is recognizable in it.’44 And as discussed extensively in Chapter 2, it is the body
schema that enables Hegel’s foremost mode of possession. The schema ‘provides us with
a way of access to the world’, and is the ‘potential source of a certain number of familiar
actions’—i.e., the body schema is ‘primarily given to us as source or power for action’.
We are able to grasp, use, and manipulate objects due to its dynamic and action oriented
nature.
What about other modes of possession? Hegel mentions the imposition of form and
marking as two other methods of acquiring property. These alternative means are impor-
tant since objectively controlling an object is a very limited mode of obtaining and main-
taining possession. In the next chapter, I will show how memory and past person-object
interactions shape our judgements of ownership. These intuitive metarepresentations will
give rise to more sophisticated modes of possession. Importantly, these additional precepts
of possession will still be related to the phenomenological principles of ownership discussed
in this chapter—in fact, the phenomenological principles will play a pivotal role in influ-
encing and shaping these newer precepts. And finally, I will use these principles to shed
light on the obscure concept of intellectual property.
42Hegel, op. cit., §59.
43Knowles, op. cit., p.52




Extending the work on the role of agency in ownership, a constitutive paper by Liepelt,
Dolk, and Hommel investigated the role of past agency on the composition of non-corporeal
object ownership. In their study, they conducted a version of the RHI using several differ-
ent objects—computer mouse, rubber hand, smart phone, and a wooden block. Implicit
measures of ownership (proprioceptive drift) were significantly greater for objects that peo-
ple had agency experiences with in the past. Particularly, illusion with the smart phone
and the rubber hand produced greater proprioceptive drifts than the computer mouse and
wooden block. According to the authors, these results show that ‘ownership can be ob-
tained for virtual non-corporeal objects that either currently move with our body or that
have been moving with our body in the past’—i.e., suggesting ‘that what we perceive as
our body is affected by knowledge about our past interactions with objects.’1
The fact that knowledge of past agency influences the sense of ownership brings to
the fore the concept of the narrative self. This means that episodic memory and past
experiences are now at play in construing the sense of ownership (towards extracorporeal
objects). In particular, the study showed that past experiences modulate the phenomeno-
logical sense of ownership. Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest, that episodic memory
is powerful enough to evoke a sense of ownership for objects that the person had agential
control over in the past. In this regard, Liepelt, Dolk, and Hommel suggest as much: ‘the
mere recall of past agency experience may’ elicit the sense of ownership.2
1Roman Liepelt, Thomas Dolk, and Bernhard Hommel, “Self-perception beyond the body: the role of




This idea that experiences and memories modulate the sense of ownership, in addition
to immediate perceptions (constituting the minimal self), is important in forming a co-
herent framework that will enable us to properly analyze ownership judgements. These
judgements operate at a conceptual level and are interpretive in nature. In particular,
ownership judgments are based on two interacting cognitive components: the phenomeno-
logical perception of ownership (restricted to cases where these feelings are present) and
inferential reasoning (generally playing an exclusive role in ownership judgments regarding
other people)—i.e., to make an ownership attribution, both the non-conceptual feelings of
ownership (or the lack thereof), and pre-existing conceptual belief stances are processed
through an ownership attribution schemata. Based on the subjective weighting of these
two components, an ownership judgement is achieved by the subject.3
Formalizing and extending the results of Liepelt, Dolk, and Hommel, I propose that
past agency experiences not only influence the phenomenological sense of ownership, but
that they modulate ownership judgments—i.e., people take into account past agency when
making ownership judgments involving self and others.
There is good evidence from developmental psychology that that is the case. A study
by Shaylene Nancekivell and Ori Friedman showed that preschoolers infer plausible person-
object history when understanding and explaining ownership. That is to say, children seem
to think that ‘past investment’ (i.e., agential involvement) in an object implies ownership
of that object.4 In addition to the evidence from developmental psychology, a slew of
psychological studies in adults corroborate the role of agential involvement, and causal
considerations in ownership judgments. In an article exploring people’s reasoning about the
acquisition of ownership, Ori Friedman compared ‘first possession’ considerations against
‘necessary for possession’ logic. The results of the study clearly favored the necessary
for possession rationale—i.e., people employed necessary for possession based reasoning to
judge ownership in third party disputes. In light of the results, Friedman suggests that
ownership judgements may be based on ‘processes akin to those used to make judgments
about causality.’5 In fact, the necessary for possession justification conforms with the
3The conception of ownership judgments that I delineated is based on a modified and amalgamated
version of the ‘Judgment of ownership’ and ‘Meta-representation of ownership’ concepts in Synofzik, Got-
tfried, and Newen, op. cit., p. 420.
4Shaylene E. Nancekivell and Ori Friedman, “Preschoolers Selectively Infer History When Explaining
Outcomes: Evidence From Explanations of Ownership, Liking, and Use”, Child Development 85, no.3
(2014): 1236-1247.
5Ori Friedman, “Necessary for Possession: How People Reason About the Acquisition of Ownership”,
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perceived agency precept, and obeys the three gestalt-like principles of priority, consistency,
and exclusivity that underpin agency perception.
The notion that ownership judgments are based on ‘an agent’s intent and control in
bringing about an outcome’ was reaffirmed in a subsequent study by Palamar, Le, and
Friedman.6 They conducted three separate experiments that showed that people judge
ownership by considering the intentional will to bring about possession—i.e., they judge
ownership based on the ‘attribution of responsibility’ principle. The authors go on to
suggest that their findings indicate that ownership reasoning is not entirely conventional
and instead based on psychological processes underlying perception of causality.
The principle of agential involvement offers a cogent and integrated framework for the
conceptual analysis of ownership intuitions, including the effects of labour on ownership. In
this regard, a paper by Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, and Hood showed that children and adults
transferred ownership of an object (e.g., modeling-clay) from the original owner to the
person that invested creative labor into the object (e.g., a person that shaped a dog using
the modeling-clay). In other words, preschool children and adults transfer ownership of
an object from the original owner to a person who creatively labours on it to make a
new object. Intriguingly, the effect was significantly more pronounced in children than
in adults.7 The results of this study are in line with the precept that human ownership
intuition takes into accounts forms of agential involvement. In particular, intentional
creative labor, an archetypal example of agential involvement, appears to play a prominent
role in the ownership attribution schemata.
In fact, as pointed out earlier, Hegel considered the imposition of form (i.e., intentional
creative labor) to be a prominent mode of possession. The reasoning underlying as to
why that is the case is made clear by looking at aspects of Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic.
Consider the following passage from the Phenomenology of Spirit :
Work is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off... (it) forms and shapes
the thing... the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure
being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires
an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness,
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36, no.9 (2010): 1161-1169.
6Max Palamar, Doan T. Le, and Ori Friedman, “Acquiring ownership and the attribution of responsi-
bility”, Cognition 124, no.2 (2012): 201-208.
7Patricia Kanngiesser, Nathalia Gjersoe, and Bruce M. Hood, “The Effect of Creative Labor on
Property-Ownership Transfer by Preschool Children and Adults”, Psychological Science 21, no.9 (2010):
1236-1241.
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qua worker, comes to see in the independent being (of the object) its own
independence.8
Hegel considered property to be the externalization of will or the embodiment of person-
ality. According to Dudley Knowles, in the above passage Hegel is asserting that creative
labor is ‘an ordered will on the external world, and our creations displays it.’9 This con-
stitutes the reason why we sometimes perceive personal qualities of the maker in their
creations. More generally, the process of creation requires the imposition of will on the
constituent objects, in order to perform the proper transformative operations.
The empirical evidence from developmental studies seems to suggest that Hegel’s second
form of possession is an important ownership rationale. Moreover, in contrast to grasping,
creation is a more enduring method of externalizing the will and expressing personality. It
may not be surprising to find that creation engenders self-object associations, and involves
a phenomenological sense of ownership towards the creation. In addition, creation is likely
to be a powerful and pervasive factor in ownership judgements.
To determine whether creation is a prevalent precept in ownership attribution, it is
constructive to discern manifestations of the principle in young children across cultures.
In this regard, an important cross cultural study of ownership in children carried out by
Rochat and colleagues showed that creation is a universal and basic principle of attributing
ownership (i.e., the principle that attributes ownership of an object to the creator). The
study involved children from seven distinct social, economic and cultural situations and
revealed that only the creation principle got used consistently, and that principles such
as first contact, familiarity and disparity of wealth did not get used uniformly. This
was despite the fact that the principle of first contact is an easier precept to cognitively
comprehend.10
A research study in adults extended and refined the ownership precept. Levene, Star-
mans, and Friedman explored the effects of creation and intention on ownership, and found
that adults predominantly applied the creation criteria to judge ownership. In addition,
they found that intention to create mattered in judging ownership—i.e., accidental creation
diminished the creator’s claim to ownership. Interestingly, the creation precept operated
even in the absence of physical possession—i.e., creation established ownership even with-
out physical possession. Perhaps, most importantly, the study showed that creation lead to
8Quoted in Knowles, op. cit., p.58
9Ibid., p.59
10Philippe Rochat, Erin Robbins, Claudia Passos-Ferreira, Angela Donato Oliva, Maria DG Dias, and
Liping Guo, “Ownership reasoning in children across cultures”, Cognition 132, no. 3 (2014): 471-484.
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ownership even if the created object had a lower value than the original material. Finally,
creation enhanced the effects of creative labor in ownership judgements—i.e., creation
mattered ‘over-and-above the labor involved in creation.’11
These results provide a compelling case that creation is a powerful factor in ownership
judgements. Moreover, the ownership precept emerges from the more basic perceived
agency principle—i.e., the person intentionally manipulates raw materials to produce a
new object. And the creation embodies aspects of the maker’s personality.
This leaves only Hegel’s last mode of possession, marking the object, outside the
purview of empirical validation. It is unclear whether marking the object establishes own-
ership. More likely, people mark already owned objects in order to publicly signal their
possession of the object. It is reasonable to interpret Hegel in that manner. In particular,
Hegel states that ‘[t]he meaning of the mark is supposed to be that I have put my will into
the thing.’12 Note, that in the statement, Hegel simply refers to the meaning of the mark,
not that the mark is an actual mode of externalizing the will. Nevertheless, it would be
interesting to see in an experimental setup whether there are cases in which mere marking
constitutes ownership of an object.
5.2 Intellectual Property
This section will try to elucidate the amorphous notion of intellectual property within the
framework of the phenomenological theory of property. The essential idea that I would
like to postulate is that thought generation is somewhat akin to action. In particular,
intentional thinking bears resemblance to intentional physical actions. They both demand
conscious will and appear to be subject to its jurisdiction in ordinary cases. In fact, the
notion that thinking is a ‘kind of action’ has been suggested previously in order to account
for certain schizophrenic experiences.13
If we accept that thinking is indeed an assemblage of some kind of non-physical actions,
and that these actions can be combined in original and creative ways, then intellectual prop-
erty is subject to the perceived agency precept and the creation principle can be invoked
to justify the concept. The former is applicable because intentional thoughts are analogous
to intentional physical actions, and intentional actions entail the feeling of agency. This
11Merrick Levene, Christina Starmans, and Ori Friedman, “Creation in judgments about the establish-
ment of ownership”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 60 (2015): 103-109.
12Hegel, op. cit., §58.
13Gallagher, op. cit., p.17; see also Christopher Donald Frith, op. cit.
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would mean that intentional thoughts are accompanied by the phenomenological feeling
of agency (a feeling that disappears in certain schizophrenic experiences). According to
the perceived agency precept, there should also be a feeling of ownership towards these
thoughts in typical (i.e., non-pathological) circumstances. Furthermore, in cases where the
thoughts are strung together in novel and creative patterns, then these thoughts constitute
a new entity. If that is the case, then the author(s) of the novel thought pattern can invoke
the creation principle in order to claim tangible ownership over their ideas.
There is some evidence in support of this account from studies in developmental psy-
chology. A study by Shaw, Li, and Olson demonstrated that 6 to 8 year old children apply
ownership principles to ideas (but not to common words )—including the necessary for
possession principle, non-transfer by theft, and control of permission rules.14 A subsequent
study investigated whether children value ideas more than labor in artistic creation. They
found that 6-year-olds valued ideas over labor (they chose pictures containing their ideas
over pictures that merely contained their labor), but that 4-year-olds did not particularly
appreciate ideas (they appeared to simply prefer pictures with their ‘idiosyncratic prefer-
ences’).15 This suggests that it takes children longer to apply the ownership concepts that
they use for physical objects to ideas. A plausible conjecture is that 6-year-olds but not
4-year-olds value ideas as unique, precious and something that may acquire them recogni-
tion or reward; therefore children need to learn the value placed on ideas (at least some
ideas) before they begin to extend ownership rights over them.
A cross cultural study with children from the United States, Mexico, and China demon-
strated that 5- and 6-year-olds from all three cultures responded negatively to plagiarism.
It follows that these children value ideas as things over which ownership rights are applica-
ble.16 A succeeding study suggested that children’s negative reaction to plagiarism is based
on the fact that it takes away credit from the rightful owner.17 This seems to indicate that
children evaluate plagiarism negatively because it violates the attribution of responsibility
principle.
In aggregate, the results from developmental psychology support the premise that the
phenomenological feeling of ownership extends to the domain of ideas and that they are
14Alex Shaw, Vivian Li, and Kristina R. Olson, “Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to
Ideas”, Cognitive Science 36, no.8 (2012): 1383-1403.
15Vivian Li, Alex Shaw, and Kristina R. Olson, “Ideas versus labor: What do children value in artistic
creation?”, Cognition 127, no.1 (2013): 38-45.
16Fan Yang, Alex Shaw, Eric Garduno, and Kristina R. Olson, “No one likes a copycat: A cross-cultural
investigation of children’s response to plagiarism”, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 121 (2014):
111-119.
17Alex Shaw and Kristina Olson, “Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowl-
edgement”, Developmental Science 18, no. 3 (2015): 502-509.
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broadly subject to the principles (e.g., perceived agency, creation, and attribution of re-
sponsibility ) of the phenomenological theory of property. Ownership of ideas may be a
natural development that reflects the ability of human children to appreciate more abstract
concepts. Indeed, creative ideas enable children to express their personality and talents
in original ways that go above and beyond the ordinary use of language. In fact, Hegel
extends the embodiment of personality account in the Philosophy of Right to the realm of
intellectual property:
Attainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free
mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by ex-
pressing them it may embody them in something external and alienate them.18
In essence, Hegel is stating that intellectual property is a proficient means of expressing
personality and externalizing the will. Perhaps, in some ways, intellectual property is
better suited to the task than physical property. In particular, the medium of the written
word is a powerful and lasting method of conveying the intentions, desire, personality, and
will of the author. The works of Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Woolf, and Baldwin attest to
that power. Moreover, Hegel’s conception of intellectual property also provides a reason for
why the author’s intellectual works shouldn’t be plagiarized by consumers. Simply stated,
a particular piece of intellectual property is an embodiment of expression that belongs
exclusively to the author.19 And the imperative of right is: ‘Be a person and respect
others as persons.’20
18Hegel, op. cit., §43.
19The Hegelian justification of intellectual property is extensively discussed by Justin Hughes in “The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property”, Georgetown Law Journal 77 (1988): 287-365.




The phenomenological theory of property developed in this thesis tells us that ownership is
a ubiquitous human experience. It is an experience that is closely related to self perception
and representation. Moreover, the acquisition of personal property is a part of the natural
social development of children that enables new forms of self expression, intentions, and
fulfilment of desires. In essence, property is necessary for concrete freedom. Perhaps not
exactly as Hegel meant the word, but in a more modest way. A conception of freedom in
the simple sense that property is needed to live a decent and dignified life. It is needed
to be free of material destitution. Indeed, a minimum amount of property is required
to adequately express one’s personality and further self-perception. This intimates that
property, despite being grounded in the neurocognitive sense of self, functions as a rich
mode of social interaction. In this regard, it is similar to the Chomskyan conception of
language. As Dudley Knowles elegantly puts it:
Freedom would be impossible were men not able to accumulate and dispose
assets required to support the conception of the good life which they adopt.
As soon as this conception goes beyond a conception of the self as atomistic
consumer, men will appropriate durable items which can be employed regularly
in the satisfaction of socially ordered, recurrent desires. Property is a social
relation akin to language in interesting ways; a medium of transparency, it
permits both self-expression and public intelligibility, both self-identification
and mutual recognition. Like language, a consciousness which determines itself
cannot be a private object of inspection.1
1Knowles, op. cit., p.57.
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The central question that remains to be answered now is how do we use the phenomeno-
logical conception of property to determine the legitimacy of the different property relations
that are found in the world. The answer to this question is important seeing the central
role that property plays in the structures of society. I will not provide a comprehensive
account of the pertinent views, but just the broad direction that property laws should
move towards in order to better conform with the dispositions that lead to property in
the first place. There are two main concerns, both related to the close connection between
personhood and property.
The first is the idea that because of the tight link between self (personal) development
and property, there should be a general right to property. The reasoning that leads to
this conclusion, in the words of Jeremy Waldron, is that ‘[w]e cannot argue, on the one
hand, that property-owning is necessary for ethical development, and then, on the other
hand, affect unconcern about the moral and material plight of those who have nothing.’2
Importantly, a person deprived of an adequate degree of property is entitled to claim that
their autonomy and development of agency has been ‘undermined’ and ‘violated’.3
The second notion is related to the concept that there should be a legal and moral
dichotomy in property rights—an idea first suggested by Margaret Radin. According to
Radin, personal property (closely bound up with the person) yields ‘a stronger moral claim’
than fungible property (possessions held purely for instrumental reasons). In addition,
Radin contends that personal property should be considered distinct from ‘other necessities
of personhood’—e.g., a welfare rights theory, providing ‘a set of core entitlements’ necessary
for personhood, should maintain the distinction between property and non-property rights.4
By synthesizing the general right to property with a dualist theory of property, we
obtain a radical conception of property rights. There is no constitution currently in the
world (as far as I’m aware) that provides a universal right to property and ensures that
every citizen is a proprietor of at least an adequate amount of personal property. If such a
conception of property were to be legally adopted, that would mean that instead of a right
to mere shelter, people would have the right to a particular house or apartment.
The final aspect of property relations pertains to labor and the methods of production.
On this theme, the spectre of Marx looms large. Interestingly, there is empirical evidence
that alienation is a real psychological occurrence. The ‘recognition’ of the laborer and
‘purpose’ of labor influences labor supply—the presence of these two factors adds meaning
to labor and positively affects the labor supply. The absence of recognition or the lack
2Waldron 1988, op. cit., p.4.
3Ibid., p.24.
4Radin, op. cit., p.988-91.
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of purpose negatively influences the laborer.5 It would appear that the laborer yearns a
certain degree of participation in the process of production, and desires recognition for their
creative work. Modifying contemporary labor laws to make them more amenable to the
worker is a complicated endeavour, but that is nonetheless the course of action suggested
by the phenomenological theory of property. As John Stuart Mill emphasized, ‘The laws
of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification of private
property rests.’6 That needs to be corrected.
5Dan Ariely, Emir Kamenica, and Drazˇen Prelec, “Man’s search for meaning: The case of Legos,”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67, no.3-4 (2008): 671-677.
6John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy [1848], (ed. Jonathan Riley) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1994), p.14-15.
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Dissociation of Body Ownership and
Agency
The dissociability of ownership and agency is a topic of ongoing research. Tsakiris, Longo,
and Haggard designed an fMRI based experiment to explore the precise relation of agency
and ownership. To regulate ownership, they manipulated the synchrony of visual feedback
and movement. On the other hand, they controlled agency with conditions of passive and
active movement. Neuroimaging of the subjects covering possible experiment conditions
(the variables of interest being agency and ownership) revealed that there was no com-
mon neural activation shared between agency and ownership. In other words, the two
experiences are represented by distinct neural representations. Alternatively, introspective
reports from the same experiment signified that the two aspects of the minimal self were
correlated. Specifically, the reports showed that agency increases the sense of ownership.
A possible explanation for the contradictory results, posited by Tsakiris, Longo, and Hag-
gard, is that there is no injective (one to one) mapping between the experiences comprising
the minimal self and neural activity.1 It should also be noted that the imaging results of
Tsakiris, Longo, and Haggard do not conform with the assortment of neuroimaging studies
presented in Section II—they pointed to both ownership and agency being grounded in
motor intentional (neural) networks.
Contrariwise, dissociability of body agency and ownership may be perceptible in the
anarchic hand syndrome. People suffering from the anarchic hand syndrome perform in-
voluntary goal directed actions with the affected hand— the person’s agency is selectively
1Tsakiris, Longo, and Haggard, op. cit.
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disturbed in that they are aware of the discrepancy between their will and actions.2 It
appears that affordances provided by objects in the environment lead to the initiation of
goal directed actions; there is no inhibition of these possible actions in keeping with the
actual motor intentions of the agent. Despite this absence of intention, the agent perceives
these actions as their own. Gallese and Sinigaglia describe this segregated dysfunction
in terms of a malfunctioning ‘control mechanism regulating the potentialities for action’
that does not overtly affect body ownership because the performed actions are nonetheless
experienced as potentialities of the ‘bodily self’. More briefly, the ‘correct instrumental
goal-relatedness of these actions’ ensures that they are experienced as motor potentialities
of the self. Therefore, the person with the anarchic hand syndrome does not deny that the
unintended action belongs to them.3
2Clelia Marchetti Sergio Della Sala, “Disentangling the Alien and Anarchic Hand”, Cognitive Neuropsy-
chiatry 3, no.3 (1998):191-207.
3Gallese and Sinigaglia, op. cit., p.749-50.
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